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The Poetics of the Encounter: 
Animals, Ethics, and God 




Despite growing interest in the past two decades, animal ethics remains a relatively 
minute area of theology.  Some writings have emerged in theological circles arguing for 
animal rights or even for how to conceive of animals in terms of conventional theological 
notions such as souls and salvation.  However, not many examine ideas and ways of 
living and being with animals in the ordinary, even mundane, situations of daily life.  I 
suggest we need to cultivate ethical imagination in our interaction with animals, and that 
one way to do this involves coming face-to-face with them and being attentive to our 
embodiment.  I draw on philosopher Emmanuel Levinas as well as theopoetics to 
represent the ethical experience of the encounter.  Texts such as The Lives of Animals and 
Disgrace by JM Coetzee provide examples of how we may engage our ethical and 
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Animal Ethics and Christian Theology 
 
 
Seriousness is, for a certain kind of artist,  





My task does not consist in constructing ethics;  





Methodology: as in a certain style of sketching, one draws a line again and again, 
layering over previous attempts.  No one of the lines alone is either sufficient or accurate.  
If one is lucky the shape will emerge from the accumulation of flawed attempts. 






Introducing the Introduction 
 
Despite growing interest in the past two decades, animals remain a relatively 
minute area of theology.  Some writings have emerged in theological circles arguing for 
Christian vegetarianism or against animal experimentation and the like
4
 or even for how 
to conceive of animals in terms of conventional theological notions such as souls and 
salvation, but not many examine ideas and ways of living and being with animals in the 
ordinary, even mundane, situations of daily life.  These are certainly steps in admitting 
that animals have a legitimate place in theological discussion and that they are not solely 
objects for the use of humans; this work also admits that human beings have a greater 
                                                          
1
 J.M. Coetzee, qtd. in Amy Gutmann, “Introduction,” in The Lives of Animals, by JM Coetzee  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 3. 
2
 Levinas, qtd. in Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, 2
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 ed. (West  
Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1999), 4. 
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 Jan Zwicky, Lyric Philosophy, 1
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 ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990), 530. 
4
 Richard Alan Young, Is God a Vegetarian? Christianity, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights (Peru, 
Illinois: Carus Publishing Company, 1999) or Andrew Linzey’s Animal Theology (London: SCM Press Ltd, 
1994) as one example from his many publications on the issue. 
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connection to the world around us than is often granted.  And yet I feel it would benefit 
theology to explore what it means to live with animals on a more everyday basis.  In 
effect, I wonder what it would look like if theology came face-to-face with the animal.   
In order to consider these possible encounters, I have found myself moving away 
from any sort of analytic philosophy or theology that conceives of our ethical relationship 
to animals in terms of prescriptive oughts or arguments based on some perceived moral 
status of the animals themselves.  Such arguments always include questions such as can 
animals act ethically?  What about those animals who exhibit more rationality or 
linguistic ability than others “lower” on a hierarchy of capacity?  Does this mean some 
suffer like human beings?  Do they have souls and can they participate in salvation?  This 
line of discussion shifts away from any consideration of the encounter itself in favour of 
delineating abstract conditions for the very grounds of the encounter.  I agree with Jan 
Zwicky’s point that “Any attempt to explain it [the ‘presence of what we live among’] 
after the manner of Aristotle, to argue for its metaphysical adequacy in a systematic 
framework, will result in some version of idealism.  The depths of anti-realism to which 
one must sink will be directly proportional to the rigour with which the arguments are 
pursued.”
5
  Instead of being restricted in our relationships with animals by questions of 
ability or status, I suggest we need to cultivate ethical imagination in our interaction with 
them, especially in order to broaden theological attention to animals beyond terms of 
food or domestication.   
One way to do this involves coming face-to-face with animals and being attentive 
to the immersion of our whole being in these encounters.  As the fragility of this is hard 
                                                          
5
 Zwicky, Lyric Philosophy, 188, no. 101. 
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to grasp through conventional systematic or logical categories, it requires a more flexible 
position that is alive to the indeterminacies and contingencies present in each encounter.  
Also necessary is a fluid sense of conceiving God as permeating our relationships with 
animals, whether we see God in the face of the animal or we are oriented to God so that 
we might continuously tune our ethical identities.  For these reasons, I turn to poetics as a 
dynamic approach that can represent the experience of the encounter with vibrancy while 
also being able to reflect on the interplays between embodiment and making sense of 
things through language.  Texts such as The Lives of Animals and Disgrace by JM 
Coetzee work to, in his words, unite “the aesthetic and the ethical,” or the poetics of 
writing with the poetics of response. 
In a nutshell, I am looking at a specific moment – the encounter with an animal – 
and outlining its theological and ethical contours through the brushstrokes of poetics.  For 
this purpose, the thesis centres on three interconnected ideas: call, orientation, and 
response.  Each chapter takes up one of these ideas, imparting a certain movement to the 
underlying structure, though there is necessarily some overlap throughout the chapters.  
One might also conceive of this structure playing out as a reflection on the mind (mental 
and emotional) side of things in Chapter 1, the engagement of the body in Chapter 2, and 
the inseparable mingling of both in Chapter 3.  In other words, the organization is a bit 
like a funnel, gradually narrowing in on the demonstration of response carried out in the 
last chapter by means of looking at the two fictional works by Coetzee. 
 
Methodological Sketches and a Number of Intriguing Methods 
4 
 
For the purposes of methodology, I rely on both my previously stated desire to 
depart from certain philosophical and theological approaches in favour of more 
imaginative understandings of relationality.  These methods lace together my concern for 
creative responsibility via the amenable notion of poetics and the ethics of Emmanuel 
Levinas, with a case study provided by JM Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals and Disgrace.  
The theological vision of grace acts as a unifying concept for the thesis, notably as it 
demonstrates sensitivity to God’s presence in unexpected relationships. 
Poetics 
What do I mean by the poetics of the encounter?  Poetics signals a manner of 
conceiving the encounter that is constructive, attentive to language and how we shape and 
are shaped by it in encountering others, and imaginative.  Though not entirely reducible 
to texts, it nevertheless demonstrates a struggle with language, meaning-making, and the 
(re)presentation of our embodied experiences.  It therefore operates both as a 
methodological vantage point – one that functions more imaginatively than conventional 
logic and embraces personal responsibility – and as a method, wherein it attends to issues 
of language, text, and creative expression.  In both cases, poetics illuminates the moment 
of the encounter, drawing attention to the thoughts and feelings that emerge as well as 
leading to a reappraisal of our own ethical responses. 
While poetics can potentially encompass broad terrain, the poetics of this project 
in part meshes with what in theology has become known as theopoetics.  Theopoetics can 
involve a more lyrical style of writing, one that wanders away from systematic theology 
to embrace the lyrical and multiplicitous, or it may remain more textually based, focussed 
on how God is conveyed in a particular work.  While my comments about theopoetics are 
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located in the first chapter, it can be said that the rest of the thesis incorporates aspects 
from both streams. 
Levinas 
French Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas devoted himself to ethics, even 
going so far as to identify ethics as first philosophy.
6
  A number of Levinas’ ethical ideas 
function as an undercurrent to the entire thesis, especially motifs such as the face and the 
àdieu.  The face forms the keystone of Levinas’ philosophy – it is the face of the other (a 
being who is completely external to us and who we cannot subsume into ourselves) that 
calls us into ethical action, prompting us to respond to their vulnerability.  Levinas insists 
that all encounters with the other are fundamentally ethical ones, a point I find 
particularly compelling when we include animals in the “other” position.  Meeting the 
animal other becomes an opportunity to find ourselves called to extend to them the 
hospitality of the kingdom of God.  The àdieu combines a tender farewell to the other 
with a sense of renewed responsibility to them, committing them finally to God; Derrida, 
a close friend of Levinas, offers a commentary on the àdieu that is especially useful in 
Chapter 3.   
Those familiar with Levinas will notice that this is a somewhat truncated account 
of his ethical philosophy which leaves out a good deal more than it includes.  
Unfortunately, this is a reality of such a short project and thus due treatment of Levinas’ 
idea of the face and the other is not adequately given.  While hints of Levinas circulate 
throughout, a more extended reflection on his thought emerges in Chapters 2 and 3.  
                                                          
6
 Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán Hand (Oxford: 




South African novelist JM Coetzee has become well-known for his writings on 
animals, especially his refusal to consider animals solely in either philosophical or 
sentimental terms, preferring instead to explore and complicate our relationality with 
them.  I focus on two particular texts in Chapter 3, The Lives of Animals and Disgrace.
7
  
The Lives of Animals is the published version of Coetzee’s 1997 Tanner Lectures 
delivered at Princeton University and they are somewhat odd in format, describing a 
character, Elizabeth Costello, as an Australian novelist giving lectures at a fictional 
college in the United States.  Costello surprises her audience by not speaking on her 
novels at all but on the treatment of animals, a subject that rankles a few present by what 
they perceive as her bad philosophy and grossly insensitive analogy of animals to 
Holocaust victims.  Disgrace offers no such explicit text within a text, instead centering 
on the upheaval that happens to professor David Lurie when he is dismissed from his 
university position for having a somewhat coercive affair with a student and not publicly 
admitting any remorse for his actions.  Instead of finding respite at his daughter Lucy’s 
farm, he gets beaten and Lucy is raped by three intruders.  In dealing with the aftermath, 
Lurie finds himself drawn to the animals around him as he volunteers at an animal clinic, 
euthanizing cats and dogs every week. 
Coetzee’s two novels provide an opportunity to examine the poetics of the 
encounter in action, especially given Coetzee’s rendering of visceral face-to-face 
meetings with animals and his emphasis on the capacity of the imagination to reach out to 
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 JM Coetzee, The Lives of Animals (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), and Disgrace (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2000). 
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both animals and people.  The Lives of Animals explores imaginatively meeting the 
animal and the possibilities of animal agency within that meeting, while Disgrace 
presents a narrative record of the shape such an engagement might take.  At the same 
time, David Lurie of Disgrace circles around questions of religious language and the 
implications of guilt, salvation, and even sacrifice while Elizabeth Costello in The Lives 
of Animals likewise ponders her involvement with animals as a means to save her soul.  
In both books, engagement with animals intertwines with a desire to make peace with 
personal exposure and vulnerability, the moment of which might be called grace.  
Grace 
Grace forms a key aspect of Christian identity.  It signals receptiveness to God’s 
love and mercy, especially through the life and death of Christ.  I conceive of grace as an 
encounter with God that prompts a fundamental re-orientation in our lives that makes us 
re-think our habituated activities in the world.
8
  It dislocates complacent patterns of 
thought and urges us to examine and renew our relationships with those around us.  Grace 
can thus be found in our encounters with animals, as when, for example, we find a 
moment of peace and ethical fulfillment in our relations with them, like David Lurie does 
at the end of Disgrace.  This idea of grace book-ends the thesis, emerging through 
discussion of love’s knowledge in Chapter 1 in regards to the lamb of God, and finding 
realization through Lurie’s actions in Disgrace towards a different sort of lamb.  
                                                          
8
 In theology, grace indicates God’s gratuitous giving of salvation to a fallen or imperfect humanity; human 
beings then expose themselves to God to receive this gift.  One of the most influential understandings of 
grace comes from Augustine, who argued that “the graciousness of God’s redeeming grace depended on its 
being absolutely unconditional on human work or merit.”  However, critics have noted that this description 
of grace omits “the contribution that one’s physical existence in time and space makes to one’s eternal 
destiny.”  In other words, our embodied reality participates in “shaping human destiny” and receiving 
grace.  Serene Jones and Paul Lakeland, eds, Constructive Theology: A Contemporary Approach to 




Chapter Maps and Other Important Information 
As mentioned above, the three chapters follow a certain flow, all aimed at 
examining a distinct moment in the encounter with animals.  Chapter 1 “Call: Face to 
Face with the Lamb of God” opens by re-examining the traditional theological image 
linking Christ and a sacrificial lamb, notably as it is expressed in paintings such as those 
of Francisco Zurbaran, suggesting that seeing the lamb on its own terms instead of as a 
placeholder for Christ can encourage new theological paradigms of relating to animals.  
This revisiting challenges assumptions about epistemology, about seeing, knowing, and 
loving the animal other; it also elicits the question of how grace may appear in these 
relations.  This chapter prepares the groundwork, briefly noting current discussions in 
theology regarding animals and where I diverge from them.  Poetics surfaces as an 
approach that can hold relationality and creativity in constructive tension, aligning to an 
extent with the theological movement called theopoetics.  Poetics allows for a 
reconsideration of how we know the animal when we meet them as well as opening the 
door for us to love them, seeing in them the face of God.    
The second chapter “Orientation: Embodying Ethical Relationship” translates the 
seeing and knowing of the first chapter into the midst of embodied relationality and the 
concomitant necessity of being oriented to God and the animal in the context of the 
everyday.  Through poetic attention to language and a study of David Lurie from 
Disgrace attending to the corpses of dead dogs at the incinerator, the shape of the 
embodied encounter highlights possibilities for appreciating the singular uniqueness and 
fragility of each animal we meet, urging us to gradually become more attuned to both 
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God and animal through every subsequent engagement with them.  At the same time, 
such attunement signals the process of ethics, something Stanley Cavell notes as the task 
of ethics, wherein we become alive to the encounters that happen in our ordinary living 
and continuously adjust our ethical responses.     
In Chapter 3, “Response: Bidding the Animal Àdieu,” I discuss The Lives of 
Animals and Disgrace in terms of ideas presented in the first two chapters – the call and 
orientation that the encounter initiates requires both response and responsibility, and this 
is studied through the lens of Costello’s and Lurie’s own vulnerability.  Despite their best 
efforts, the level of need they see in the animals around them causes them to break down.  
The question becomes how to respond and put into motion our responsibility for the 
others around us if this ethical task becomes mentally and emotionally overwhelming.  I 
offer as one possible answer the hope of the àdieu, the Levinasian committal of self and 
other to God, wherein we acknowledge the responsibility entrusted to us by the animal 
but admit both our helplessness and our positioning towards God so that we may find a 
measure of peace in the midst of our ethical task.      
 
Conclusion to the Introduction 
Driving this thesis is the desire to motivate recognition of our myriad encounters 
with animals and how we can realize our ethical responsibility towards them.  This 
somewhat narrows the concern of animal ethics in theology from a more broad-ranging 
eco-theology to a focus on individual responsibility for the animals we meet on a daily 
basis.  This could of course manifest in the vegetarianism for which some Christians have 
advocated – my own vegetarianism emerged from distress about the treatment of all 
10 
 
animals in factory farms.  However, I argue that response and responsibility also 
implicates more complex and subtle forms of involvement with animals, particularly 
insofar as both encounter and response often take place in a split second without benefit 
of substantial thought.  We have to feel our way through things, doing the best we can to 
honour the preciousness of animal life, seeing the face of God in the singularity of 
particular animals.  We know them through plunging the self into relationality with them.  
But while the encounter may be fleeting, it can be infinitely rich, especially if we become 
attuned to the presence of God in our future encounters with animals and the rekindled 
need for us to take responsibility for their vulnerability as well as ours; this is the hopeful 
possibility of grace and of deepened appreciation for God’s manifestation in the lives 
around us.  In this manner, it harkens back to the insight articulated by eco-theology that 
we are vitally interconnected with the animals and world around us, though I hope to 
draw attention to this on the smaller scale of the face-to-face meeting.  Poetics alerts us to 
the encounters we have with animals in the midst of our everyday living, showing us the 






















Face to Face  
with  
the Lamb of God 
 
 
That is the kind of poetry I bring to your attention today: poetry that does not try to find 
an idea in the animal, that is not about the animal, but is instead a record of an 





But perhaps in the attentive – or I might even (too naively?)  say loving – conversation of 
philosophy and literature with one another we could hope to find, occasionally, 
mysterious and incomplete, in some moments not governed by the watch, some analogue 






First Thoughts:  Reconsidering the Lamb of God 
 
Animals have frequently held a prominent place in Christian religious imagery 
and theological expression; indeed, a lamb stands at the heart of Christian theology.  
Acting as a symbol for the sacrifice of Christ on the cross, the lamb has become a 
ubiquitous metaphor and artistic figure, a visual touchstone for representing Christ’s 
relationship with humanity.  But while the metaphor highlights the sacrificial nature of 
Christ’s death, it simultaneously occludes a certain way of seeing and thus of relating to 
the lamb itself – the animal is of little interest beyond its role of signification, subsumed 
into the person of Christ.  I question whether the animal should be glossed over so readily 
in favour of one prominent theological interpretation and wonder if closer consideration 
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 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 51. 
10
 Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 284. 
12 
 
of the image might yield important insights for how theology can engage animals and 
animal ethics in light of growing interest in this area. 
While the symbolism continues to be frequently depicted in religious painting, 
Spanish artist Francisco Zurbaran took it as his subject a number of times over the course 
of his career, notably dwelling on the figure of the lamb.  In Zurbaran’s 1638 painting 
Adoration of the Shepherds, there is a lamb in the bottom right hand corner, just below 
and off to the side of the manger where a new-born Christ rests amidst a flurry of 
attention.
11
  The lamb is isolated from the others surrounding the manger and bound so 
that it cannot move.  In the Agnus Dei completed two years later,
12
 Zurbaran paints the 
lamb lying by itself on a hard, flat surface with its eyes staring dully and all four legs 
trussed together.  Adoration of the Shepherds makes explicit the purpose of the lamb and 
its affiliation with the baby Jesus, while in a different version of the Agnus Dei from the 
same period, Zurbaran includes the faint outline of a halo above the lamb’s head to 
indicate it as a symbolic stand-in for Christ.
13
  Even in the unadorned rendering of Agnus 
Dei the name enforces the connection, and it is this title Agnus Dei – the Lamb of God – 
which immediately imposes an interpretation upon the viewer, that of Christ’s sacrifice.   
                                                          
11
 In the collections of the Musée des Beaux-Arts, Grenoble, France.  Francisco Zurbaran, Adoration of the 
Shepherds, oil on canvas, 1638,Web Gallery of Art: 
http://www.wga.hu/html_m/z/zurbaran/1/shepherd.html 
12
 Museo Nacional del Prado in Spain.  Francisco Zurbaran, Agnus Dei,oil, 1635-1640: 
http://www.museodelprado.es/en/the-collection/online-gallery/on-line-gallery/obra/agnus-dei-the-lamb-of-
god/.  This version of the Agnus Dei also serves as the cover to Matthew Scully’s book Dominion: The 
Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002). 
13




All three paintings incorporate a centuries-old guide
14
 for how to understand the 
lamb – when we see its sadness and resignation, its meekness and silence, we 
immediately substitute it for Christ’s attitude prior to his crucifixion.  However, this 
carries certain consequences for our relation to the lamb as an actual animal, 
consequences akin to Rachel Muers’ and Carol Adams’ observation that we have written 
our theology onto animals, but in doing so, have effectively penned away the lives of the 
animals themselves:  
They are, literally and figuratively, what we write both our central texts and our 
marginalia onto.  When we look at the Dead Sea Scrolls, to use Adams’ example, 
we focus on the text and not on the animal skin.  The very act of writing the text 
reduces the animal not only to voicelessness, but to invisibility as anything other 
than a resource for human use.
15
 
Is it possible to have a relationship with the lamb in the painting on terms beyond its 
figuration as sacrifice, to admit that it has a voice and that it is calling to us?  There is a 
certain challenge involved here:  we think we know the lamb – it is, after all, a metaphor 
for Christ, and what else can it be, we ask?  It is speaking for Christ and surely that is all 
the attention a humble lamb requires.   
Perhaps, however, the image of the helpless lamb lying alone on the grey platform 
can provide the impetus for a new encounter, for a new way of seeing and understanding 
the animal and thus for forging a distinct relationship with it.  Zurbaran’s unembellished 
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 Stemming in large part from verses such as Acts 8:37, John 1:29, and 1 Peter 1:19. 
15
 Rachel Muers, “The Animals We Write On: Encountering Animals in Texts,” in Creaturely Theology: 
On God, Humans and Other Animals, ed. by Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough (London: SCM 
Press, 2009), 138. 
14 
 
version of the Agnus Dei potentially prompts a moment of epiphany: we realize that this 
lamb will have its throat cut and its blood drained for the sacrificial ritual.  There is no 
redemption or possibility of escape for it; the tight coils of rope around its legs make sure 
of that.  What do we feel at our recognition of the lamb’s complete and utter helplessness 
and vulnerability?  Do we feel indifference, compassion, pity, or nausea at how it will 
unwillingly be lead to the slaughter?  Do we have any sort of ethical responsibility as a 
result of this recognition or do we shrug our shoulders at our response to the painting, 
saying that there is nothing we can do?  At the very least, do we notice other animals 
around us more, be it animals on the street or even on our plates? 
In looking at the painting before us, we are brought into relationship with this 
particular lamb.  At the same time, the implications of animal sacrifice bring to mind the 
millions of other lambs that have also been killed throughout history, be it for sacrifice or, 
in contemporary terms, food.  There exists the necessity of keeping in balance individual 
and collective bodies, the life of a certain animal and the wellbeing of a whole species, 
and I think this tension is one of the major tasks of theology when reflecting on current 
debates about animal ethics.  Theologians such as Andrew Linzey
16
 and Richard Alan 
Young,
17
 among others, have done admirable work in bringing our attention to the 
collective plight of animals across the globe, from those raised in factory farms for food, 
dissected in labs for science, put on view for entertainment, killed for fashion, or just 
eliminated for reasons of sport or overpopulation.  And yet this single, acquiescent lamb 
                                                          
16
 See his seminal Animal Theology (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1994). 
17
 Richard A. Young, Is God a Vegetarian? Christianity, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights. 
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calls out to me for a response now, requiring not just my advocacy for its siblings in the 
slaughterhouses but for its plight at this very moment. 
But even if we focus theology on our individual relationships with animals, how 
do we go about framing this encounter, what discourses do we rely on, and what rhetoric 
do we use?  For much of the discussion, theology has been in dialogue with philosophy, 
asking questions about animal capacities and animal rights and if the appropriate 
Christian articulation will be shaped by these ideas.
18
  As Kelly Oliver has noted in 
regards to philosophy, such arguments have tended to rest either on identities of sameness 
or difference without concentrating on our actual relationships with animals themselves.
19
  
They rely on abstract scientific modes of thought in order to calculate our obligations to 
animals by first determining their placement on a hierarchy of capacity or ability, 
weighing animals’ similarity to human beings in terms of rationality, pain, and 
language.
20
  At the base of such attempts lies what J.M. Coetzee bemoans in The Lives of 
Animals – that of finding an idea in the animal, or, in other words, of reducing the animal 
to a single epistemological assumption that then drives all further ethical interaction.  
                                                          
18
 Andrew Linzey is one proponent of animal rights, while George Frear Jr. rejects both utilitarian and 
animal rights approaches  as adequate for theology.  George L. Frear, Jr. “Caring for Animals: Biblical 
Stimulus for Ethical Reflection,” In Good News for Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, 
edited by Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993). 
19
 Kelly Oliver, “Animal Ethics: Toward an Ethics of Responsiveness,” Research in Phenomenology 40 
(2010): 267-280. 
20
 Both the utilitarianism put forward by Peter Singer in Animal Liberation (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1975 [reprinted 2002]), and the argument for animal rights by Tom Regan in The Case for 
Animal Rights, Revised Edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) participate in the 
delineation of a hierarchy based on an animal’s ability to reason or feel pain.  There have been significant 
refinements in each of these camps since Singer and Regan first wrote (see, for example, Martha 
Nussbaum’s emphasis on the unique flourishing of each species, something for which utilitarianism cannot 
account, and how this can be represented in terms of animal rights, although Nussbaum does incline 
towards sentience as a marker of justice).  Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond ‘Compassion and Humanity’: 
Justice for Nonhuman Animals,” in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, ed. Cass Sunstein 
and Martha Nussbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
16 
 
While the upsurge in philosophical interest has been crucial to re-thinking our treatment 
of animals and encouraging political protection and justice for them, these particular 
currents still enforce a level of intellectual distance and detachment that my body rebels 
against when it sees the powerless lamb awaiting its death. 
Theology has pursued a number of different paths in reply to growing interest in 
animals and animal ethics, ranging from a re-assertion of human dominion over 
animals,
21
 various reformulations of animal rights (one of the best known being Andrew 
Linzey), substantial concern about Christian diet and animals,
22
 and a broader sense of 
animals as a part of eco-theology.  As the most expansive field in all of the above-
mentioned areas, eco-theology somewhat re-works the philosophical approaches by 
insisting that we are all creatures under God, sharing life together on the planet and thus 
indissolubly inter-connected and inter-dependent.  Each life, on both an individual and 
collective scale, assumes importance in this circular web.  As Cecilia Deane-Drummond 
and David Clough argue, a focus on creatureliness is a step to repairing the “high 
boundary wall between Homo sapiens and every other species of creature within 
creation.”
23
  This premise undergirds much of the recent work in theology centering on 
animals and has been vital in arguing for the value of all creatures; however, it takes a 
                                                          
21
 Stephen vanTassel, Dominion Over Wildlife? An Environmental Theology of Human-Wildlife Relations 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009). 
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comprehensive look at animal life while spending less time exploring the possibilities for 
more personal relationships with individual animals.   
The lamb in the painting calls to me as a single, unique creature, not just as a 
placeholder for Christ and not simply as a stand-in for the whole of its species.  I may not 
be able to cut the coils binding this specific lamb, but I can nonetheless respond to it and 
let its needs influence me – in other words, I can meet it face-to-face and open myself to 
how an encounter with this animal implicates me as a Christian in the radical infinitude of 
this particular moment.   Rather than writing theology on its broken body, the focus on 
this individual in front of me involves a co-authoring of ethics and a willingness to enter 
into creative relationality, thereby admitting that we are all porous and susceptible to each 
other’s influence.   It is this encounter with a single animal that I concentrate on, arguing 
in the manner of Emmanuel Levinas that it is fundamentally ethical in nature.  The face-
to-faceness demands that we acknowledge the ethics that pervade and constitute such an 
encounter and how it calls forth an ethical response.  This simultaneously prompts the 
necessity of considering and potentially re-framing the very ideas, concepts, and beliefs 
that we bring to that encounter, including how we interact with animals, how we engage 
them epistemologically, and how we can love them and constructively desire their 
wellbeing.   
Yet such a way of conceiving relationship with animals calls for a mode of 
thought that borrows in measure from philosophical reflection and theological emphases 
without resorting to rigid categories like the moral status of animals or questions of 
whether or not they partake of any soteriological design.  There must be a methodology 
that strikes a balance between serious reflection and a willingness to bare our own soul in 
18 
 
the face of the other’s vulnerability, as well as a method that can capture the exquisite 
contingency of everyday encounters with animals.  Poetics embodies the flexibility and 
strength required, possessing thoughtfulness combined with attention to diversity of 
experience.  In particular, theopoetics – an emerging current in theology, just like animal 
ethics – emphasizes the necessity of being more alert to the imaginative possibilities of 
poetics and language when re-envisioning relationality with animals and consequently 
with God.   
Accordingly, in the rest of this chapter I explore ways in which theopoetics can 
challenge traditional categories of relating to animals, including the lamb in the painting, 
and provide alternate orientations to thinking about, knowing, and loving them.  Instead 
of ignoring the face of the animal, poetics makes us alive to the myriad ways in which 
they call us to be in relation to them.  It is this idea of being open to their call, of 
adjusting our intellectual patterns of perceiving their need and interacting with them, that 
motivates the following sections as well as running as an undercurrent to the entire 
chapter.  The next two chapters will build on this idea of playing creatively with how we 
think about, understand, and represent our responses to encountering animals ethically, 
blending aspects of theology, philosophy, literature, and literary criticism in the process; 
these chapters will dwell more on the embodied aspects of relation.   
 
New Paradigms for God-talk and Animal-talk: Theopoetics 
Theopoetics breaks open the categories for reaching for God through language 
and experience and is consequently well suited to not finding an idea “in” the animal, 
admitting instead the animal’s inscrutability and distinct ways of moving in the world and 
19 
 
being present in the encounter.   Theopoetics can best be described as a process, not a 
product, system, or thing to dismember and scrutinize.  It repositions theological 
discussion toward practices of interacting, describing, and representing rather than 
concluding, unifying, or solidifying.  While there is no clear consensus about how 
theopoetics should be defined or employed, that is exactly the point.  It is not a model, 
but a record of engagement, to use Coetzee’s phrase in a different context, and it strives 
to use and understand language imaginatively in order to acknowledge heretofore 
unacknowledged possibilities for relating to others as well as to God. 
Despite this indeterminacy, John Caputo notes some possible patterns inherent in 
the use of poetics as a mode of thought and practice:    
By a poetics I mean a constellation of strategies, arguments, tropes, paradigms, 
and metaphors, a style and a tone, as well as a grammar and a vocabulary, all of 
which, collectively, like a great army on the move, is aimed at making a point.  
We might say that a poetics is a logic with a heart, not a simple or bare bones 
logic but a logic with pathos, with a passion and desire, with an imagination and a 
flare, a mad logic, perhaps a patho-logic, but one that is healing and salvific.
24
  
Though theopoetics by no means rests upon adherence to an explicitly textual metaphor, 
one can liken this to an act of reading the world around us wherein certain dynamics such 
as imagery, issues of representation, and rhetorical considerations are at play in how we 
understand the narrative or poetic clues for what meaning should be gathered.  Of course, 
traditional written texts of all sorts are an important part of the process, in the double 
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sense of poetics – poein – as making/creating and as representing.  What they offer is not 
a mere aestheticizing of experience, a premature criticism levied upon theopoetics from 
various quarters, but a critical engagement with experience that is attendant to meaning 
not captured by logical forms of interpretation and writing but that is equally important.
25
  
Poet and philosopher Jan Zwicky proposes just this idea in what she calls “lyric 
philosophy” in which she  
[seeks] a grammar of thinking equipped to parse coherence of this kind...Lyric 
understanding does not proceed by breaking down wholes into parts, nor by 
adding up parts into wholes.  Rather, it perceives particulars in such a way that 
their resonant unity is grasped in an instant of recognition.  We don’t deduce 




Poetics reaches for this involuntary “aha” moment when we intuit meaning and then 
attempt to relay it in a “grammar of thinking.”  It pursues a way to describe what Zwicky 
might call the emotional resonances of our experience that logic has no means of 
discussing.
27
  Caputo’s constellation and Zwicky’s lyric understanding thus indicate a 
methodological vantage point that translates into the practice of attention to more vibrant 
ways of reflecting on text and daily experience. 
Bearing in mind the goal of provoking critical engagement, I understand 
theopoetics to foreground three particular elements that are crucial to a poetics of the 
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encounter:  it is imaginative, relational, and it emphasizes response.  Each of these 
elements ties into a dynamic view of ethics that stresses personal responsibility while 
respecting the viewpoints, ideas, and needs of others.  It is thus less a prescription than an 
attempt to grapple with the ethical implications of our experiences in theological 
language:   
 
• It works imaginatively – it resists propositional knowledge and theology 
and thus ties into Levinas’ insistence that ethics is not about (Westernized, 
scientific) knowledge.  So, for example, what Catherine Keller writes of Richard 
Kearney is equally true of a theopoetic endeavour: “For this work he does not 
seek to define the proper style for God-talk, so much as perform it by 
example...He does not thereby attenuate the (possible) content of God-talk so 
much as gently shift its potency from the propositional to the imaginal.”
28
  
Shifting God-talk in this way leaves room open for identifying how God-talk can 
take place in literature and other explicitly poetical texts, though it is by no means 
restricted solely to narrative or poetry.  Rather, we can view such texts as 
generative, initiating dialogue – literally – in other words, encouraging us to do 
the same in our everyday relationships. 
 
• It highlights relationality – Our interactions with others are always ethical 
and always relational, but this can become a commonplace truism to which we no 
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longer give much thought.  What Caputo calls theopoetics’ mad logic 
characterized by passion and pathos disconcerts complacent ways of relating, 
perceiving value in opening oneself to being disturbed and unsettled from our 
usual modes of seeing and being seen.  It urges us to assess the quality of our 
relationships and seek greater personal responsibility when encountering others. 
 
• It emphasizes response – poetics and poeisis necessarily involve creativity, 
but creativity itself is always predicated on a response to something without 
seeking to own that something.  Response is an integral part of the ethical process 
– it is the doing of ethics and indicates both the affect a situation has had on us as 
well as our willingness to participate in a relationship with another – but it is 
difficult to render this nebulous moment into language.  Theopoetics does not shy 
away from engaging imaginative language to try to envision this response and 
negotiate how our responses take place in and shape our daily experiences.  
Theopoetics can thus be understood as inherently dialogical in a very Bakhtinian 
sense, founded on a back-and-forth conversation built on response to the other. 
Theopoetics thus holds the resources for enlivening our theological thought about 
animals, encouraging us to see the animal in front of us while not being deterred by the 
ambiguity that arises out of our feelings or ethical questioning.  Theologians such as 
Catherine Keller and John Caputo perform theopoetics by example in their writing, 
embracing an energetic style to convey ideas.
29
  They also find themselves free to pursue 
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unique analogies and ways of seeing relationship with God.  In both style and vision, they 
model a theopoetics interested in the vibrancy of relationships in the here and now, one 
that I will consistently draw upon in thinking about our encounters with animals.  In 
short, poetics holds together emotion and reflection, imagination and philosophy, in a 
creative tension in order to delve into the nuances and subtleties of experience. 
 
Towards a Poetic Epistemology of the Encounter 
The theopoetics of epistemology fundamentally involves a shift from seeing 
knowledge as propositional – something to be quickly uncovered, processed, and 
classified – to understanding it as imaginative and encompassing our whole being, not 
just our centres of rationality.
30
  In propositional epistemology, there is usually a subject 
actively seeking facts about a given object.  The relationship moves in one direction and 
only the subject has anything to gain.  This paradigm has reduced animals to objects 
without offering them any possibility of voice or participation – we look at the lamb and 
categorize it as sacrifice, food, or experiment, but never as a being with a capacity for 
relationship.  
The encounter provokes a serious challenge to reasoned forms of knowing 
because of its ambiguous positioning in our experience:  the lamb we are about to kill 
looks at us for a moment and we feel vaguely unsettled.  Ethical questions rise unbidden 
– am I doing the right thing? Is it suffering? Why is it looking at me like that?  Our 
previous confidence escapes us.  It does not seem to be just a ‘dumb’ animal after all; 
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rather, it appears to be saying something to me.  Within a poetic epistemology, we do not 
appropriate the object ‘lamb’ – indeed, the object slips away from the category “object” 
entirely, leaving us with empty hands.  Subject-object positions become confounded as 
we simultaneously experience ourselves as subject pursuing knowledge about another 
being and also as an object being seen by the animal.  Instead, the question of ethics 
arises as we are now involved in a relationship with the animal before us. 
The encounter represents a liminal moment, marked by uncertainty, unknowing.  
We scrabble for meaning and knowledge, but if we are not to do violence to the other that 
we meet, then we must re-make our experiences with alternate forms of knowing.  In 
other words, we must un-know – un-learn – our previous modes of interaction with 
animals through a process of re-education.  For Emmanuel Levinas, ethics must jettison 
all pretenses to Western epistemological frameworks to be ethics.  It means, in effect, 
giving up claims to certitude of moral knowledge – this is how I deal with this animal – 
and instead coming face-to-face with the perpetual questioning of true ethical 
responsibility, though this more often than not involves the distress of not knowing in any 
factual sense.  In The Ethics of Ambiguity, Simone de Beauvoir notes this disquiet when 
she refers to Kierkegaard’s thoughts on what constitutes a truly alive morality: 
Kierkegaard has said that what distinguishes the Pharisee from the genuinely 
moral man is that the former considers his anguish as a sure sign of his virtue; 
from the fact that he asks himself, “Am I Abraham?” he concludes, “I am 
Abraham”; but morality resides in the painfulness of an indefinite questioning.
31
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The questioning requires the activity of re-thinking our traditional methods of 
determining (ethical) knowledge, but at the same time recovers moral questioning as its 
own formatively unique type of awareness.  Instead of being the antithesis of true 
knowledge, questioning forms a crucial part of its foundation.   
Rowan Williams reiterates the idea that the knowledge of the other required for 
ethical action does not necessarily reside in the ossified ways of knowing that believes it 
can establish the identity of the other.  Rather, there needs to be a sense of sharing 
through incompleteness.  We may not know facts about the other, and, indeed, the animal 
other may seem incredibly strange, stupid, or frightening, but we can know in terms of 
poetics that something critical and meaningful has passed between us in our encounter.  
Williams thus anticipates Levinas when he stresses the need to encounter the other 
without condensing them to our selves, but also in arguing that this way of ethically 
meeting the other moves us closer to God.  Williams remarks that, 
The stranger here is neither the failed or stupid native speaker, nor someone so 
terrifyingly alien that I cannot even entertain the thought of learning from them.  
They represent the fact that I have growing to do, not necessarily into anything 
like an identity with them, but at least into a world where there may be more of a 
sense of its being a world we share.  Recognizing the other as other without the 
immediate impulse to make them the same involves recognizing the 
incompleteness of the world I think I can manage and moving into the world 
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which I may not be able to manage so well, but which has more depth of reality.  
And that must be to move closer to God.
32
  
In other words, we can make peace with partial, imperfect knowledge, resisting the need 
to dominate the animal by means of a knowledge that appropriates and annihilates both 
what it knows and what escapes it.  The lamb of God can thus be known as more than a 
sacrifice and more than the metaphorical substitute for Christ; it is a living, embodied 
creature of whom we can gain only imperfect knowledge of its life and its potential 
suffering as it lies bound waiting to be killed.  As Williams argues, we might not be able 
to handle this dynamic scenario as well as before, but it cultivates a more profound 
ethical imagination that ultimately brings us closer to God.  And, as it turns out, God has 
a good deal to say about meeting animals on their own terms and learning to respect their 
individual patterns of existence in the world. 
 
Knowing God in the Animal: An Excursus 
The chaos of our verse may open up unfamiliar understandings.  But how  
would they not escape the ‘vertiginous failure’ of a history that nihilates what it 
cannot appropriate? 




The notion that God can be found in the encounter is an old one, finding voice in 
theophany.  But far from being occasioned solely in instances requiring copious amounts 
of flame, strong winds, or other such dramatic elements, the Bible teaches that theophany 
can materialize in interactions with all sorts of others – other people, creatures, and even 
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the lands and waters themselves.  To use both Sally McFague’s and Catherine Keller’s 
metaphor of the world as God’s body, we can encounter God anywhere, in anything.
34
  
They are careful to theologically frame the metaphor of God’s body so as to avoid the 
charge of pantheism while maintaining insistence on tuning our perspective to find God 
in what Romand Coles would call the radical ordinariness of our lives.
35
 
This is perhaps what biblical writers have been pushing for all along:  when we 
turn ourselves to the needs of the least among us, be it feeding them or carrying a burden 
for them, we are doing this to Christ himself.  Engaging the world poetically allows us to 
conceive of the sacred aspects of the encounter, shifting traditional notions of the sacred 
to the visual glimpses, fragile moments of touch, and stirrings of sound that mark our 
meetings with others.  The encounter signifies a hazy moment at the boundaries of what 
we know and what we thought we knew, pushing us to meet the other with a sense of 
newness and wonder.  In the midst of this, a space is opened up to care for the 
vulnerabilities we all expose when we interact and it is in this moment of exposure and 
vulnerability that biblical texts say God can be found.  
Keller asks, “Is the only God who can be ‘seen’ amidst the infinities and 
infinitesimals the one who shares the risks of the creatures, the vulnerabilities of birth, the 
passions of beauty?”
36
  Job affirms the answer as an unequivocal yes with God’s 
remarkable speech in the midst of the whirlwind:  here, God meets God’s own creatures 
face-to-face, holding, amongst other, the raven, the deer, the ostrich, the horse, and the 
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eagle up as an astonishing reply to Job’s anguished questions about God’s justice and 
presence in the world.  God even traces the Leviathan’s body like that of a lover’s, 
tenderly drawing out minute details of its embodied existence.  Here are its delightful 
eyes, God says: look – they are like the eyelids of the dawn!  Even its nostrils breathe 
forth smoke, its breath kindling coals with the flame that comes out of its mouth.  “Will it 




God here provides a paradigmatic moment for knowing the animal and for 
knowing God at the same time.  God exalts (in) each animal individually in the whirlwind 
speech in an example of knowing not as annihilation, but as participation in a glorious 
dance of what the encounter can be.  Such knowing confounds epistemological rationality 
that desires to appropriate the object, the epistemology that Levinas rejected as being in 
opposition to true ethics.  Thus, this poetical undertaking drastically re-orients the very 
enterprise of knowing in a way that can ultimately be reconciled with Levinas’ ethical 
endeavour while foregrounding the presence of God. 
At the same time, such a poetics accentuates the idea of knowing as a decidedly 
uncertain practice wherein the “I” of subjectivity becomes tangled up inextricably with 
knowing as process (and not knowing as divvied into the extremely limited categories of 
passive or active).  In other words, we continually know, are knowing, and are known in 
the cyclical ebb and flow of living.  This is very much in contrast to dominant models of 
epistemology in which we are the objective knowers, coldly set apart from that which we 
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know.  Instead, it finds echoes in Annie Dillard’s observations that “What I aim to do is 
not so much learn the names of the shreds of creation that flourish in this valley, but to 
keep myself open to their meanings, which is to try to impress myself at all times with the 
fullest possible force of their very reality.”
38
  For Levinas, aloofness, distance, and 
detachment hinder true ethical engagement.  In Job, God demonstrates passion for the 
smallest details of an animal’s existence, knowing the very complexity of Leviathan 
inside out and even devoting attention to how the deer give birth.  God’s example shows 
us how to be open to the lives of animals while letting ourselves be known to them at the 
same time in a disconcerting moment of self-exposure.   
 
Love’s Knowledge and the Hope of Grace 
A poetic epistemology acknowledges that the animal is distinct in God’s body and 
has the potential to call to us in ways we have hitherto ignored.  This approach avoids the 
tendency to flatten difference, something that ignores a particular animal’s own needs and 
vulnerability, while recognizing that they have their own agency in the world.  God starts 
the process in Job, supplying us with an extraordinary example of a vibrant and non-
arrogating knowing of Leviathan and other animals such as the deer, ostrich, and wild ox.  
However, we are still slightly at risk for this account to become too impersonal.  Despite 
the reclaiming of importance for ethical ambiguity and imperfect knowledge, we have yet 
to interpret the visceral reaction we are prone to in any encounter with others.  I may 
experience wonder and God’s presence in the lamb readied for sacrifice, but how do I 
make sense of my feelings of love for its fluffy, vulnerable little body or my anguish at 
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what is going to happen to it?  The body seems to take over at a certain point, sharing an 
embodied connection with the lamb.  This is partially where Levinas will come to the 
forefront in the next chapter in his description of the face, how it makes a claim on us in a 
haunting need for response, and how it pulls us into embodied relationality with it.  The 
face is utterly unique and entirely different from myself, but we are both drawn into an 
encounter that encourages new ways of orienting ourselves in the world.   
The entanglement of the self in the process of knowing means that our emotions 
and feelings will necessarily be involved.  This realization also invites consideration of 
how self and knowledge can be transformed in light of an understanding of how love can 
develop ethical capacity, recognize our bonds with others, and express a desire for the 
wellbeing of those around us.  In her book of the same name, Martha Nussbaum writes of 
“love’s knowledge,” wherein the surprising and unexpected surges of emotion frequently 
experienced by the body often point to feelings and dispositions we do not think we 
possess.
39
  In other words, Nussbaum suggests that emotions indicate aspects of what 
matters most to us that philosophical reflection does not always capture, and we should 
pay attention to the fact that emotions and states of being like love carry with them an 
important source of knowledge for how we live and interact with others.  Though this 
may seem self-evident to some people, Nussbaum argues that philosophy has often 
ignored this facet of existence in favour of an abstract form of reasoning that discounts 
the vagaries of the emotions, the same type of reasoning that seeks to dominate what it 
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perceives to be an object.  Nussbaum’s idea of love
40
 acknowledges how we are affected 
viscerally by others and in turn how we re-evaluate the ethical underpinnings of our 
relationships.   
Though Nussbaum warns of the dangers of peremptorily dismissing the emotional 
side of things, she simultaneously recognizes the need to reflect on the emotional 
experiences we do have so that we are aware of what they are saying and how they 
influence us.  Nussbaum’s account of the emotions and love thus finds echoes in the work 
of theologians such as Graham Ward, who cautions against the conflation of love with 
flights of desire and consequently the need for love to be educated by and immersed in 
Christ’s incarnation: 
the economy of [Christian] desire is not locked into love as not-having.  Rather, 
love is continually extended beyond itself and, in and through that extension, 
receives itself back from the other as a non-identical repetition.  Love construed 
as having or not-having is a commodified product.  It is something one possesses 
or doesn’t possess.  It is part of an exchange between object and subject positions.  
But love in the Christian economy is an action not an object.  It cannot be lost or 
found, absent or present.  It constitutes the very space within which all operations 




                                                          
40
 Strictly speaking, Nussbaum posits many varieties of love.  The point here, however, is that she suggests 
a connection between “love” generally, our emotions, and knowledge. 
41
 Graham Ward, “Suffering and Incarnation,” in The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology, ed. 
by Graham Ward (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 205. 
32 
 
Love is a marker of the work we put into our relationships with others.  It is the emotional 
response of compassion, empathy, or understanding directed outwards, and this very 
response points to the effort we are exerting, effort that is profoundly ethical.  Ward’s 
placement of love in a Christian economy deliberately rejects the commodified desire that 
often gets knotted up with love, a desire that seeks to possess the other and annihilates 
their uniqueness in the process.  Love for the other requires that individual desire be 
subordinated to concern for the other’s wellbeing.  Like knowing, love is not an object 
but a passion pervading the ethical “I”; it is also a space that dissolves the polarities of “I” 
and “them.”  Here, our positions “are both constituted and dissolved” as Ward observes.  
When this happens, love acts as an indication that we have heard the call of the animal 
and that we are extending ourselves ethically towards it as a result. 
Once we admit love’s knowledge and extend ourselves through this love, we 
become open to possibilities of grace in the encounter, wherein grace signifies a moment 
in which ethical questioning and visceral reaction become fused into the hope for and 
practice of God’s love and redemption.  For Christian theology, Christ’s life and death 
function as the catalyst for discussions of grace.  Through the love signified by its 
sacrificial character, his life and death evoke a sense of participation in grace via notions 
of mercy, compassion, and reconciliation, wherein relationships hold the possibility of an 
incompleteness that is mutual and affirming, of leaving behind disordered love and 
power, of getting a second chance at living with God and with those around us.  Indeed, 
we can argue that grace exists only in the perpetual motion of this relationality.  Leaving 
aside the intricacies of various doctrines of grace, perhaps the grace opened up between 
33 
 
us and God by Christ’s life and death may evidence itself wherever we likewise expose 
ourselves to the radical ordinary surrounding us.   
The moment we realize the lamb has its own enfleshed existence apart from its 
metaphorical servitude marks the moment we simultaneously bare ourselves to new 
possibilities of grace in the everyday act of looking at an animal in a painting.  Such a 
comprehension frees our attitudes to notice the other hitherto invisible animals calling to 
us on a daily basis, impressing themselves upon us in their uniqueness and individuality.  
An opportunity for engagement and interaction, response and responsibility, emerges as a 
result and influences our ethical selves – we can experience grace through our loving 
relations with an animal we have come to know in vibrant new ways.  Grace therefore 
furnishes the hope towards which the encounter aims. 
 
Liberating the Lamb, Metaphorically Speaking 
In this chapter, I have argued that one reason we cannot hear the call of the lamb 
who is bound to Christ’s sacrifice is because we have already placed it within a certain 
epistemological framework that precludes more imaginative means of relation; our 
emotional reactions to its plight are discounted and there is little room for any sense or 
performance of love.  Fortunately, there are other possibilities we can draw on in order to 
bring theology face to face with this lamb.  I suggest that poetics provides a way of 
cutting the lamb loose from its theological bindings, helping us acknowledge the fleshly 
realities of its life and death and also its power to influence our ethical existence.  Its 
embrace of dynamic modes of conceptualizing and representing daily experience offers 
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resources not given much credibility in philosophy or theology,
42
 allowing us to move 
into new ways of knowing and extending our ethical selves towards the lamb through 
love and thus of achieving the possibility of grace and right relations with God and 
animal.  In so doing, poetics serves as a starting point for reconsidering fundamental 
aspects of our encounters with all animals, not just the lamb in the painting.  It enables us 
to hear their voice and reconsider their vulnerability and need on an individual basis, 
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Embodying Ethical Relationship 
 
 
Lyric Philosophy: thought in love with clarity, informed by the intuition of coherence; by 
a desire to respond to the preciousness of the world.  Thought, therefore, conditioned by a 





This exterior being is named ‘face’ (visage) by Levinas, and is defined as ‘the way in 
which the other [l’Autre] presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me.”  In the 
language of transcendental philosophy, the face is the condition of possibility for ethics. 
Simon Critchley
44
   
 
 
Performing Relationship in the Kingdom of God 
 
In Chapter 1, I suggested that theology would benefit from giving more attention 
to ethical issues arising from encounters with individual animals, and that poetics offers a 
means of reflecting on this relationship.  Through its embrace of embodied, experiential 
meaning, poetics makes a space for imperfect knowledge and lack of moral certainty 
while also understanding this ethical questioning as a place where love can emerge.  Love 
directs us toward the animal and God, but it this moment of direction, of orientation, that 
concerns me in this chapter.  If a poetics of epistemology (see Chapter 1) opens up the 
possibility of different ways of relating to animals, what shape could this relationship 
take and what will be its central features?  Caputo provides some clues in his discussion 
of the kingdom of God:  hospitality, affirmation, and a doing of relationality are central to 
enacting the kingdom, which Caputo argues welcomes everyone in a very radical 
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  These three elements together indicate an orientation towards the animal, one 
that demonstrates an acknowledgement of their enfleshed existence and unique needs.   
This acknowledgement of their individuality is well-described by Emmanuel 
Levinas’ idea of the face, which highlights both the distinctiveness of the animal as well 
as important ethical facets of our relationship with them.  Recognition of the face 
functions as a moment of defamiliarization.  It disturbs our routine patterns of seeing and 
interaction with others, prompting us to re-assess our ordinary everyday encounters.  This 
destabilization of the ordinary in turn allows a fresh look at our ethical responses, and this 
will partly be accomplished through language, particularly poetic representation.  Such 
representation marks an attempt to understand our relationships and what responses and 
responsibilities they involve in evocative terms rather than prescriptive ones.  Seeing the 
face means grappling with our visceral experiences.  It is through language, however, that 
we begin to fathom how we position ourselves towards others.  The words we choose 
illustrate our inevitable entanglement with the bodies of animals and allow us to struggle 
with the sense of this enfleshed experience so that we can adjust our ethical response 
accordingly.  We do not necessarily achieve any level of sense in one single moment of 
illumination.  This requires more of a gradual ethical process, as each encounter in which 
we participate carries with it an abundance of unconscious, unintentional feelings, 
thoughts, and emotions that incessantly affect us and shape our future responses.  From 
this visceral, ethical, and linguistic tumult, animals emerge from invisibility to tangibly 
influence us.  Through Levinas’ idea of the face, we can grasp how they call us into 
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ethical relationality, even if we do not think their claims are always readily apparent.  It is 
through the process of ethics and continuous relationality that we become more attuned to 
their vulnerability and the ways in which we can respond.   
 
Dead Dogs and the “Honour of Corpses” 
Though it is necessary to be aware of potential plummets into the codified or 
hardened language that hinders the possibility of the God-event of hospitality of which 
Caputo speaks, poetics simultaneously points to the patterns, intricacies, and strangeness 
in the very words we use to gesture towards the meaning we find around us.  Poetics 
plays with language in order to seek the resonances of experience enfolding our 
discourse.  And, while Levinas’ ethics run as the undercurrent to my intimations of the 
encounter, Other-talk can become tediously abstract and depersonalized.  Poetic attention 
to language and its limits in representing experience – or what Jan Zwicky calls lyric 
understanding – illuminates the particular:  this is not any face that is calling to me, but 
this dog in front of me or this chickadee outside my window.  Such understanding 
becomes invested with unmistakeable urgency – this could be my only encounter with 
this chickadee and I will probably not “get things right” when I respond or fully 
understand what I am doing.   
In J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace, main character David Lurie helps out at the local 
animal clinic.  Every week, a significant number of animals are euthanized, and Lurie 
“takes charge of disposing of the remains” (144).  He finds himself unable to leave the 
bodies at the dump over the weekend amidst the trash and carrion – “he is not prepared to 
inflict such dishonour on them” (144) – and drives them on Monday morning instead.  He 
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then loads them one at a time onto the trolley that goes into the incinerator.  Lurie does 
not have to do this, but the workers who previously did it beat the stiffened corpses so 
that they fit on the trolley, breaking limbs with “the backs of their shovels” (144).  
Admitting to himself that it is a rather strange, even stupid action, he wonders why he 
does it anyway: 
For the sake of the dogs?  But the dogs are dead; and what do dogs know of 
honour and dishonour anyway?  For himself, then.  For his idea of the world, a 
world in which men do not use shovels to beat corpses into a more convenient 
shape for processing.  The dogs are brought to the clinic because they are 
unwanted: because we are too menny.  That is where he enters their lives.  He 
may not be their saviour, the one for whom they are not too many, but he is 
prepared to take care of them once they are unable, utterly unable, to take care of 
themselves...Curious that a man as selfish as he should be offering himself to the 
service of dead dogs.  There must be other, more productive ways of giving 
oneself to the world, or to an idea of the world...He saves the honour of corpses 
because there is no one else stupid enough to do it. (146) 
David Lurie is not quite sure why he ushers the dead dogs to the incinerator – the very 
last encounter in which they will participate – but the need to honour their lives and 
bodies impels him nonetheless.  In so doing, he displays an orientation towards them that 
proves significant even though the dogs can no longer benefit from it.  As one crucial 
instance of his various meetings with animals, this moment taps into the poetics of 
relationship – it brings to the forefront the notion that ideally each encounter re-orients us 
toward each specific animal we meet, as we admit our own helplessness even as we seek 
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to care for the vulnerability of these animals and extend to them the overflowing 
hospitality of the kingdom of God.  Certainly, Lurie realizes his own powerlessness to aid 
the dead dogs and he does not hold much hope that his action means anything to the 
world at large.  Yet it means something profound to him, something fundamentally 
ethical:  he does it because no one else will.  He both affirms the lives of the dogs and 
extends to them one final act of hospitality. 
Much hinges on what we devote to the words we attach to our experience.  Jan 
Zwicky writes:  “Analytic style invites us to concentrate on the thought ‘behind the 
words’ – the ghost trapped in the machine.  Lyric forces the question in the opposite 
direction: is the thought achieved?  Are its soul and its body indistinguishable?”
46
  She 
also realizes, through her concept of domesticity (humanity’s technical existence in the 
world, or use of tools), that “To become domestic is to accept that one cannot live in 
wordlessness.  This is compatible with wanting to.  It is subtended by our understanding 
of its nature.”
47
  When Lurie calls himself stupid for caring for the corpses, he is 
struggling to clarify his involvement and make sense of what he is doing.  When 
compared to other altruistic endeavours like feeding orphans or providing care to animals 
while they are still alive, Lurie’s deed does not seem that important in the larger picture.  
Yet it means something to him, something that will not quite fit within the grand scheme 
of things, but which is nonetheless important to him.  As Zwicky maintains, we cannot 
always sort our analyses of experience into systems – there will always be something 
indefinable, something that escapes distillation into pure logic, but that we nevertheless 
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feel the need to try to represent.  It becomes a matter of welcoming the indeterminacy of 
our language, opening ourselves to exposure in and through language in an attempt to 
make sense of our embodied encounters with others: 
No system can do justice to the intensity and complexity of lyric experience.  Nor 
can lyric language succeed where systems fail by referring more precisely.  What 
is needed is not words that pretend they are doing justice, but words that convey 
an awareness of their own inadequacy, their inevitable conditioning by grammar 




It is not the essence of the encounter we are after here, but the impressions, feelings, and 
contingencies that emerge as a marker of our (ethical) relationality and orientation to the 
animal.  “Stupid” seems a strange word to describe Lurie’s emotional state, but it suffices 
to capture the ambiguity of his feelings and the puzzling nature of his actions.  Stupid 
does not do justice to the depth of his experience, but it does hint at the self-exposure he 
feels by caring for the bodies.   
The relationship between representing experience and orienting ourselves to 
others draws out the idea of sense and resonances, not essences.  Levinas maintained that 
“My task does not consist in constructing ethics; I only try to seek its meaning (sens),”
49
 
a position that seeks less to define moral oughts than to appreciate the depth of the ethical 
in the everyday, something which Zwicky keenly understands in her emphasis of lyric 
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philosophy as resonance and through her attention to the physicality of hearing and 
making sounds.  Awareness of the resonances of experience signifies a different kind of 
attunement to the things around us that does not rely on objective, positivistic knowledge.  
Instead, this awareness learns in action and on the ground through encountering the other 
face to face.  Relationality occurs through the body, through the unbidden rise of 
emotions and the body’s enfleshed immersion in the encounter.  This highlights our 
interdependence and how we are shaped ethically in perpetual contact with others.   
Zwicky uses an appropriately embodied metaphor in describing this form of 
relationality through what she calls lyric:  “Lyric is based in an integrity of response and 
co-response; each dimension attending to the others.  The mouth of lyric is an ear.”
50
  The 
response and co-response of lyric indicate the dynamic back-and-forth exchange that 
occurs in a relationship, even as the centrality of the ear – of listening – points to 
relationship as involving the whole person.  The soul and the body, intertwined, turn 
together towards God and animal in a moment that nurtures affirmation and hospitality.  
This very quality of being fundamentally interwoven with others also means that we are 
always already in the middle of an encounter.  This acknowledges our continuous 
entanglement in the stuff of life – we are continuously amidst and betwixt things, flowing 
into relationality with the others around us and recognizing the vitality of our everyday 
relationships.  It is a matter of keeping our ears open and identifying how we respond to 
this constant flux, including how we shape these encounters into words. 
The words we use for matters of representation and meaning are actively linked to 
our actual embodied orientation to all of the others around us.  Lurie may think he is 
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stupid for his relationship with the dead dogs, but he also believes he is honouring them.  
Honour here becomes another curious word that semantically demonstrates how Lurie 
has positioned himself physically and psychologically towards the dogs.  For Lurie, 
“honour” emerges as a touchstone for his experience of carefully loading the dogs onto 
the trolley so that they go into the incinerator in one piece and then standing there waiting 
while they are cremated.  “Stupid” and “honour” mark attempts for Lurie to grasp 
meaning through language by trying to understand just what he is doing.  At the same 
time, they summarize his ethical attitude – he is the only person willing to stand watch 
with the dog corpses and to take care of them, even if there will be no material benefit 
from his actions.   
There is always the temptation for language to become nothing more than a 
salutary rite of acknowledgement, emptied of constructive ethical significance.  However, 
the poetics of the encounter (and certainly Zwicky’s lyric philosophy) suggests that there 
is a crucial connection between body and soul, that both can be oriented together.  The 
halting words we use show a step toward the animal.  But what is it exactly that we are 
stepping toward?  Animal seems a rather vague word to reveal the complexity of their 
existence and the affect produced in us by encountering them.  To admit that they have a 
voice and are important to theology, we need to sketch an idea of how we are encouraged 
to move into relationship with them.  In describing the evocative nature of the face 
instead of assembling an ethical system, Levinas offers a useful way of conceiving the 
individuality of a given animal and how we can honour each face, just as Lurie honoured 




The Face and the Possibility for Ethics 
The positioning that emerges from relationship in the flesh divests the self of 
third-party detachment, exposing us instead to a multiplicity of encounters with self, God, 
and animal other.  We cannot hide behind words or consider them a safe haven against 
involving our visceral being; instead, they direct us to take account of the very 
embodiment of that response and how we are situated vis-à-vis the animal.  What Levinas 
terms the face presents one such way of responding to the animal while remaining open 
to its uniqueness, balancing the tension between maintaining their individuality and 
identifying the need to respect them theologically and ethically. 
The face stands out as the most recognizable feature of Levinas’ ethics, 
encapsulating his core ideas regarding the ethical relationship.  At the same time, it 
remains an ambiguous concept, hard to describe and consequently open to 
misinterpretation, especially insofar as it simultaneously evokes physicality yet is not 
reducible to it.  Theologian Roger Burggraeve illustrates this paradox and it is worth 
quoting him at length: 
If we go in search of what Levinas means by the term “face,” we immediately 
encounter a great, but obvious misunderstanding. When we hear the word “face,” 
we spontaneously associate it with “countenance,” with the physiognomy, facial 
expression, and, by extension, character, social status, situation, and past, that 
means the “context” from which the other person becomes visible and describable 
for us. The face of the other thus seems to coincide perfectly with what his 
appearance and behavior offers to “seeing” and “representing.” By taking literally 
an “option” regarding the other person, we suppose ourselves able to “define” 
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him, whereupon we then also delimit our reactions and behavior... What Levinas 
really means by the “face of the other” is not his physical countenance or 
appearance, but precisely the noteworthy fact that the other—not only in fact, but 
in principle—does not coincide with his appearance, image, photograph, 
representation, or evocation. “The other is invisible” (TI 6). According to Levinas, 
we therefore can not properly speak of a “phenomenology” of the face since 
phenomenology describes what appears. The face is nonetheless what in the 
countenance of the other escapes our gaze when turned toward us. The other is 
“otherwise,” irreducible to his appearing, and thus reveals himself precisely as 
face. Surely, the other is indeed visible. Obviously, he appears and so calls up all 
sorts of impressions, images, and ideas by which he can be described.
51
 
The face therefore defies simple classification, emerging out of each unique encounter.  
Levinas even goes so far as to use the term invisible, suggesting that, confronted with the 
embodied other, the self necessarily must learn how to see not just their material presence 
but an aspect of their alterity, or their individual distinctiveness.  This is ultimately a 
visceral moment, and one that unsettles the self and upsets its complacency.  In a curious 
reversal of seeing the face of the other even in the midst of their death, David Lurie 
recognizes the face of the dead dogs when he honours their corpses by re-arranging their 
stiffened limbs on the incinerator trolley rather than hacking at them with a shovel.  Their 
lives are completely invisible to the workers at the dump – they are merely remains in an 
inconvenient shape that need to be processed.  By resisting this view and by 
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understanding the dead bodies to possess an intrinsic honour, Lurie, even in his self-
admitted selfishness, is aware that neither the physical face nor even the quality of being 
alive has the sole capacity to provoke reaction.  Instead, Lurie and the dogs participate in 
a moment of mutual exposure that goes beyond the vulnerability shared between living 
creatures to extend to the living and the dead.
52
  He possesses this perplexing, “stupid” 
need to honour the dogs’ dead bodies while they have no one else to help them and they 
are “unable, utterly unable, to take care of themselves” (146). 
While not specifically describing the face of Levinas’ ethics, Dennis Lee provides 
an example of this provocative meeting: 
There is a moment in which I experience other people, or things, or situations, as 
standing forth with a clarity and a preciousness which makes me want to cry and 
to celebrate physically at the same time...It is the moment in which something 
becomes overwhelmingly real in two lights at once.  An old man or woman whose 
will to live and whose mortality reach one at the same instant...Each stands forth 
as what it is most fully, and most preciously, because the emptiness in which it 
rests declares itself so overpoweringly.  We realise that this thing or person, this 
phrase, this event, need not be.  And at that moment, as if for the first time, it 
reveals its vivacious being as though it had just begun to be for the first time.
53
 
Contingency and vulnerability etch the face, marking what Zwicky calls “losability” – the 
preciousness of “things [blooming] into their own radiant specificity” and the knowledge 
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that such preciousness can be easily lost.
54
  The primacy of the ethical burden lies on the 
self to respond and be responsible to this vulnerability.  The basis of this call is an old 
idea – “thou shalt not kill”
55
 – but it nevertheless carries with it an unmistakeable 
particularity – “thou shalt not kill me.”  It seeks response, not violence, and it is this 
moment that constitutes ethics for Levinas.  Violence takes many forms, however, and 
the killing and death of the other indicates far more than their physical death – it implies 
annihilation of their “radiant specificity.”   This can occur through physical or 
psychological harm, but it also manifests in more subtle ways of encountering the face.  It 
arises in the positivist epistemology that Levinas decries, which seeks only essences, not 
ethics, and consequently disdains the other’s claim upon us.  Derrida implicitly speaks 
about both kinds when he notes philosophers’ tendency to ignore the animal: 
If, indeed, they [past philosophers] did happen to be seen furtively by the animal 
one day, they took no (thematic, theoretical, or philosophical) account of it.  They 
neither wanted nor had the capacity to draw any systematic consequence from the 
fact that an animal could, facing them, look at them, clothed or naked, and in a 
word, without a word, address them.  They have taken no account of the fact that 
what they call “animal” could look at them, and address them from down there, 
from a wholly other origin.
56
 
For Derrida, the animal sees – a capacity of orientation usually reserved for people – and 
it addresses us from its position as other.  It addresses the philosophers, but they have 
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committed the violence against which Levinas warns by refusing to see that the animal 
sees them.   They persist in defining the animal according to their own preconceived 
ideas, thus denying that it has a face.  True response for both Derrida and Levinas 
includes recognizing the face of the animal as first step. 
 
Excess and Ethical Change 
Somewhat paradoxically, the greatest challenge to seeing the face of the animal 
other comes from Levinas himself.  Levinas did not understand his ethics as including 
animals, even though he famously wrote about Bobby, the dog that visited him and other 
prisoners in a German concentration camp in World War II.  He called Bobby “the last 
Kantian in Nazi Germany,” appreciating the dog as an affirming presence of the 
prisoner’s humanity in the midst of such atrocity.
57
  Despite Bobby’s enduring influence 
on his thoughts regarding his time in the camp, Levinas refused the question of whether 
animals have a face to which human beings can ethically respond. 
Nevertheless, several scholars have since argued that animals do indeed ‘fit’ the 
main ideas of his ethical philosophy.
58
  Levinas’ exclusion and the subsequent attempts at 
ascertaining animals as both being Other and possessing a face immediately become 
entangled in practices of classification and moral justification in order for them to be seen 
and deemed worthy of being engaged ethically.  To use Caputo’s terms, animals are 
viewed as being outside the kingdom and thus excluded from hospitality, discounted 
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from any meaningful relationship with God or human beings.  The question, for Caputo, 
is one of who gets in and who gets left out.
59
  Levinas’ ethics can be otherwise be seen as 
embodying the radical hospitality Caputo holds up as constitutive of kingdom politics, 
and, indeed, he professes his indebtedness to Levinas for his understanding of such 
hospitality. 
At the same, perhaps it is a matter of coming to see the animal as Face, a process 
of ethical relationality opened up by our positioning towards God and other.  David Clark 
argues that Bobby recognized the prisoners as human in the midst of the dehumanizing 
Nazi regime.  Though Levinas strenuously denied this possibility, in a way Bobby 
recognized the face of the human prisoners, barking and jumping up and down at the 
sight of them.
60
  Clark further suggests that 
Language is the implacable human standard against which the animal is measured 
and always found wanting; but what if the ‘animal’ were to become the site of an 
excess against which one might measure the prescriptive, exclusionary force of 
the logos, the ways in which the truth of the rational mind muffles, strangles, and 
finally silences the animal?  These questions are worth asking, it seems to me, 




I tentatively wonder if the logos which Clark describes – the propositional rationality 
which I have been arguing against as the dominant model for encountering the animal – 
can be re-read in terms of Christ as divine logos, the enfleshed Word of God.  Borrowing 
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Caputo’s own poetics of the impossible, the mad hatter’s kingdom of God
62
 revels in 
such exultant role reversals – Bobby sees the face of the human, the ethics philosopher 
cannot hear the call of ethics, and Christ transforms the logos into the paradigmatic 
expression of welcoming all into his relational embrace.  Fundamental here is the excess 
that pervades both the kingdom and all of our ordinary relationships as well as the very 
attempt to situate the animal.  For Caputo, excess destabilizes the usual way things are 
done – it provides an entryway into seeing the kingdom differently.  Once again, 
however, this excess is not something quantifiable or containable by the usual routes of 
argumentation.  Rather, it carries with it its own ethical dimension. 
In theoretical discourse, excess is often represented in terms of rupture, breakage, 
shock – all words that forcefully feel hard and jagged, indicative of a momentous action 
occurring at the level of the self.  There is even a dimension of violence implicit in the 
rhetoric: shattering boundaries, disrupting categories, fracturing assumptions.  But a lot of 
ethical change is prompted through more subtle means, occurring over time and through 
daily situations rather than in the more urgent moments of life.  It is felt as a softening 
wherein experience sinks into the body to become part of our embodied memory and 
identity.  This is distinctly at odds with notions like Lacan’s jouissance, where an 
encounter with the Other – jouissance – is experienced as traumatic.
63
  But describing 
excess as a slow, gentle infusion does not lessen its influence.  Instead, it traces the 
pathways through which excess runs away from propositional language and knowledge 
into self and body.  It is not introjected, to borrow again from psychoanalysis, swallowed 
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whole by the mouth to sit undigested.  Rather, it is held by the hands, absorbed by the 
skin, flowing through the movements of our muscles.  These are visceral metaphors that 
disregard any premise that ethics lives in the head, emphasizing that only through poetics 
can we struggle to realize the depth of influence that the ethical possesses.  Thus, while 
many ethical phenomena can be shocking or even traumatic, much ethical work is carried 
out far more innocuously and behind-the-scenes, so to speak.   
In the encounter, we are called by the face in an address which, in terms of ethics, 
ideally overruns our sense of self-sufficiency and power, comparable to Jean-Luc 
Marion’s notion of the saturated phenomenon “in which what is given to intuition 
exceeds the intentionality that becomes aware of it. My transcendental ego cannot 
anticipate it, nor can my concept contain or comprehend it. My horizons are 
overwhelmed and submerged by it. I am more the subject constituted by its givenness 
than it is the object constituted by my subjectivity.”
64
  Excess, like love, unsettles fixed 
subject-object relations, initiating a more fluid relationship of exposure, vulnerability, 
response, and responsibility.  The encounter with the other also leaves a trace in our 
personal history as well as our ongoing trajectory, meaning that ethics and ethical 
responsibility deepen as time goes on.  Response is not necessarily immediate, and the 
excess of the encounter bleeds over into daily practices with response potentially 
emerging at strange, unexpected moments.  Excess causes changes in our positioning 
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toward God and others, involuntarily making slight adjustments in how we see, know, 
and act in the world.
65
  
This mode of excess proves transformative for David Lurie in Disgrace through 
his prolonged exposure to various animals – he goes from honouring the corpses of dead 
dogs to cradling the body of a living one as he ushers it not just to the incinerator, but 
through the moment of death itself.  Lurie has experienced change in this regard, 
especially as he can now call this act of accompanying the dogs through death love (219).  
But Lurie has only come to this realization through his previous encounters with the dead 
dogs in the dump, the sheep to be killed for a dinner party, and finally the dog that is 
attached to him.  Each animal has left their trace on him. 
At the same time, the kingdom of God itself “is a certain excess in the world,” 
which furthermore leaves traces of God’s presence on all of the others we meet.
66
  It is 
the abundant, surplus nature of excess that institutes the radical hospitality of the 
kingdom that Caputo describes – excess disregards conventional boundaries placed 
around who gets in and who does not, who is worthy of ethical attention and who gets left 
by the wayside, arguing that there is enough love for all.  This hospitality without 
guarantee of reciprocity – another crucial aspect of Levinasian ethics – effectually 
subverts the hospitality of this world by asking for nothing in exchange when the self 
responds to the other.  Rather, it demonstrates the self’s relation to God, who in turn 
orders the self’s relation to others: 
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The self is always already turned to God, who has in turn turned the self to the 
stranger, deflected it in a certain way, ordered and commanded the self to the 
stranger, who bears God’s trace and seal.  Being turned to the Other means a 
devotion to God that responds without desire for reciprocity, in a love without 
eros, in a relation without correlation and reciprocity, like the nonreciprocity, the 




This represents a lavish love that overflows the disordered desire mentioned in Chapter 1 
and makes room in the kingdom for the animal other, tying our wellbeing to theirs in an 
act of what Caputo calls ‘doing God.’  Even so, embracing the kingdom in this way 
means cultivating the capacity not just to see, but to see the ‘radiant specificity’ of each 
guest that enters – in other words, to see the invisible other. 
 
Voir l’Autre invisible 
One of the chief risks of engaging in “Other” talk is the possibility of de-
personalizing the face through the very act of rendering our ethical necessity to it.  In 
other words, the face becomes an anonymous other for whom I ought, in an abstracted 
moralistic sense, to do something.  However, Levinas’ point that the face is not reducible 
to physiological entity proves provocative for the very reason that it means the face will 
always be singular and completely unique – there is always a face expressed in the 
radical infinitude of a particular moment.  The ought emerges not from a pre-formulated 
moral system, but from the time- and situation-specific call of the other who addresses 
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me.  During his former position as a professor of communications at a university in Cape 
Town, David Lurie would probably not have imagined that he would eventually be 
loading dead animals onto a conveyor belt to be incinerated. 
In terms of animals, such a claim saturates the everyday with ethical importance 
for the key fact that animals surround us, filling our living spaces with their bodies, 
sounds, and needs.  Campaigns aimed at bringing awareness to momentous examples of 
animal cruelty such as factory farming, animal testing, and the clothing industry are 
crucial in addressing animal wellbeing on a large-scale level, but at the same time, these 
sizable efforts neglect the animals of the everyday in their goal of making wide-spread 
societal changes.  But part of achieving such a goal lies in acknowledging the ethical 
importance of particularized response, because there is a potential relationship to be 
honoured – because we have a Face in mind when we cringe at hearing the ways in which 
cattle are slaughtered or hens are caged.  Our flinching reaction to the animals in food 
factories or in laboratories points to our empathy with the suffering of those individual 
animals and the recognition that something has gone badly askew in our ethical 
relationship with them.  This empathy is part of the process of tuning ourselves to the 
multitude of other animal faces around us, of coming to see their faces and their own 
specific needs.  There are just too many faces, however – we are just too menny, Lurie 
thinks about the dead dogs – when the image of the abattoir is invoked, and ultimately 
this can dull response into a sense of futility rather than passionate ethical action.  
Emphasis on everyday meetings with animals can restore focus to the individual animal 




Derrida writes about his own realization of animals’ indisputable particularity in 
regards to his cat who accompanies him around the house.  He offers an especially 
poignant remark that the cat is an “irreplaceable living being,” one who, moreover, enters 
his space and has the audacity to look at him while he is naked:   
No, no, my cat, the cat that looks at me in my bedroom or in the bathroom, this 
cat...does not appear here as representative, or ambassador, carrying the immense 
symbolic responsibility....If I say “it is a real cat” that sees me naked, it is in order 
to mark its unsubstitutable singularity....I see it as this irreplaceable living being 
that one day enters my space, enters this place where it can encounter me, see me, 
even see me naked.  Nothing can ever take away from me the certainty that what 
we have here is an existence that refuses to be conceptualized.
68
 
This cat cannot be conceptualized or reduced to a biological organism,
69
 merely one of 
millions of domesticated felines throughout the world.  This cat affects Derrida, 
undeniably through its material presence, but also because Derrida suddenly sees the 
losability of this particular cat addressing him.
70
 
For Derrida, a cat prompts his astonished speculation, one in the rather awkward 
location of the bathroom no less.  For Levinas, it is the dog Bobby, a frequent visitor to 
the concentration camp where Levinas was imprisoned.  Cat, dog, bathroom, 
concentration camp – the disparate circumstances are noteworthy.  There is the mundane, 
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even banal ordinariness of the bathroom, as well as the wrenching situation of the 
concentration camp.  Both occasions speak to the perhaps rather obvious notion that the 
capacity for animals to influence us is both ubiquitous yet entirely singular – animals are 
everywhere yet there is always a specific animal expressed by the face who is addressing 
me at a particular moment.  As such, there is an urgency to the encounter that somewhat 
heightens the stakes.  We can here remember Zwicky’s point that “The gift of lyric is to 
see the whole in the particular; and in so doing, to bring the preciousness, which is the 
losability, of the world into clear focus.”
71
   
In other words, the animal who has hitherto remained largely invisible becomes 
visible when we re-orient ourselves to them.
72
  But, as Zwicky emphasizes, a poetic or 
lyric attention to this shift also involves recognition of the losability of the very 
particularity it points out in the first place.  To see, but to see how something can be lost.  
This losable quality stresses the fragility of the animal we are encountering, highlighting 
its vulnerability within the context of life and death.  In Disgrace, the singularity of the 
face manifests in the easily over-looked observation that a certain dog enjoys music.  
Such a characteristic distinguishes this dog from the others in the clinic, marking its 
uniqueness but also drawing attention to a precious quality of that dog that would be lost 
by his death.  The context of the clinic tragically underlines both his preciousness as well 
as his vulnerability in the midst of an environment in which a great number of 
euthanizations are carried out on a regular basis.  Seeing the face therefore carries with it 
a high cost – “the world is secured by the act of relinquishing it...the way to secure the 
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world from loss is to give it over to the fullest possibility of loss.”
73
  Despite this, it is 
necessary ethically to engage the possibility of loss and honour our relationality with the 
face of the animal.  To do this, we must do our best to put our orientation into motion and 
respond.   
 
The Ethics of the Encounter  
It is therefore not enough to admit the fragility and losability of the irreplaceable 
animal in front of me.  The idea of ethics always involves notions of “effective 
operations,” to quote Michel de Certeau,
74
 implying some sort of concrete action to be 
taken.  Yet ethics here is not a clearly-defined set of steps, but becomes jumbled up in the 
processes of adjusting our capacities to see and hear the call of the animal other.  The 
excess that flows through the encounter blurs the lines between what should be done and 
what happens, between demarcations of passive and active.  Nor does ethical 
responsibility necessarily conclude once some condition of the ought has been met.  
Ethics is risky business, complicated by the indeterminacy of the encounter – its 
unknown and unpredictable characteristics – and by our response, which unavoidably 
takes place in a situation encumbered by limits and restraints. 
To reiterate an earlier point, we are always in the middle of an encounter – it is 
not a discrete event,
75
 a situation requiring a one-time ethical response.  Levinas’ notion 
of responsibility is radical precisely because of the enduring demands it makes upon us, 
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even after the death of the other.
76
  Acknowledgement of this simultaneously involves 
recognition of the extraordinary in the ordinary, an admission of the degree to which our 
ethical encounters inform, shape, and saturate our ongoing daily existence.  It also means 
not taking the ordinary for granted, allowing the self and our ethical responses to stagnate 
and submerge into apathy and indifference: 
The vivid extremes in responding to the world-wide existence of food factories is 
a cautionary, even lurid, example warning against supposing that the ordinary in 
human life is a given, as it were a place.  I would rather say that it is a task, as the 
self is.  I sometimes speak of the task as discovering the extraordinary in what we 
call ordinary and discovering the ordinary in what we call extraordinary; 
sometimes a detecting significance in the insignificant, sometimes as detecting 
insignificance in the significant.
77
 
Cavell emphasizes the task of responding to the radical ordinary.  Our encounters with 
the animal other are simultaneously ongoing (as in we bear the traces of each encounter 
as we move through life) and concretely unique.  Yet we often only get one chance to 
respond to the other, and this means that we will make mistakes and (either intentionally 
or unintentionally) do violence to the animal;
78
 it is a bit of trial-and-error as we learn to 
tune ourselves to the (previously) invisible others around us.  As we will see in the next 
chapter, Coetzee’s main character David Lurie spends little time thinking about animals 
when he first goes to live on his daughter’s farm.  It is only after more exposure – in 
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terms of physical contact as well as emotional proximity – to the dogs, sheep, and clinic 
animals that Lurie can even do such a small act as carefully re-arrange the limbs of the 
euthanized dogs so that they are not haphazard and askew on the platform heading to the 
incineration chamber.   
I thus identify Cavell’s task as partly the province of excess: even if we do not 
“get things right” in a particular encounter, the excess – the visceral emotions, thoughts, 
and feelings that cannot be summed up by propositions, but can only (if at all) be 
tentatively grasped through lyric – gradually works on our selves nonetheless to produce 
changes in our attitudes and our capacities for seeing and knowing and – crucially – 
responding to each new animal other.  Lurie’s act towards the dead dogs eventually leads 
to his cradling a live dog about to be euthanized, signalling a hefty shift in his relating to 
animals overall – he now responds to them very differently (thus embodying a new 
orientation towards them) after many weeks of agonizing work in the clinic.  The task – 
one embodied by Lurie – is a matter of becoming “transparent to presence.”
79
  This is “to 
become vulnerable,” but it also requires attending to the texture of that presence:  “what 
is present is that: present.  It stays with one.  That is, it has meaning.”
80
  Coming face to 
face with the animal, even if it is not on a daily basis like Lurie, involves both poetic 
attentiveness and a willingness to let the animal work on us through our embodied 
memory of the encounter, transforming us, even if it is only in small ways. 
 
Conclusion 
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Speaking once again of the mad hatter’s tea party that he identifies as the event 
that initiates the kingdom of God, Caputo says, “If the event calls upon us, addresses us 
and invites us, then we enter the kingdom by responding to the invitation in spirit and in 
truth.  Ask and it shall open to you, or answer, because you have already been called.”
81
  
Caputo frames his understanding of the event of God as a call, an address, and an 
invitation, all evocative terms that can equally describe the call of the animal’s face.  We 
are invited to respond to the animal who addresses us, thereby opening up ourselves to 
both animal and God.  As has been outlined above, this involves mistakes, the 
vulnerability of exposure, and the struggles of meaning-making through language and the 
representation of experience.  Ultimately, the goal is a new position towards both God 
and animal other.  We are invited through the ethical process into new sight and thus into 
new relationality, into bodily immersion in the radical ordinary of our everyday 
encounters.  Sometimes it may not seem like we are actually helping the animal, just as 
Lurie felt he was contributing nothing of great value to the dogs by guarding their 
corpses, but there is nevertheless an ethical honour to the action, one which, moreover, 
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Bidding the Animal Àdieu 
 
 
My own life has convinced me that the limitations most of us encounter in our relations 
with other animals reflect not their shortcomings, as we so often assume, but our own 





From its opening pages, Disgrace is about the debilitation of imagination.  Its subject is 
estrangement.  Its mood is bereaved.  Slipping from one register to another,  
from figure of speech to embodied form, it repeatedly describes  








In which we invoke the poetics of the encounter with regards to the poetics of the literary 
text, finally committing both animal and ourselves to God. 
 
Though best known for his writing in the context of South African apartheid/post-
apartheid, JM Coetzee has spent a great deal of time considering the question of animals.  
Invited to deliver the 1997-1998 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, Coetzee 
diverged from the usual lecture format, choosing in its place to present the story of 
Elizabeth Costello, a well-known novelist giving lectures at fictional Appleton College 
on the subject of animal ethics.  Complete with scholarly footnotes displaying substantial 
knowledge of the philosophical debates about animals, The Lives of Animals
84
 received 
widespread attention, and the published version contained reflections from people in a 
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variety of disciplines concerned with animal issues, including such noteworthy names as 
Peter Singer and Barbara Smuts.   
But Coetzee’s interest in animals was not a one-time curiosity restricted to public 
events; instead, it pervades one of his most famous novels, Disgrace,
85
 even in the midst 
of its concerns about post-apartheid South Africa.  Indeed, there are a number of 
interplays and parallels between Costello in The Lives of Animals and David Lurie in 
Disgrace, though the two characters move in very different circles.  Both demonstrate a 
willingness to encounter animals and their unique faces, be attuned to their needs, and 
recognize their call to respond ethically.  In this sense, both texts suggest that while the 
animal may epitomize the figure of the unfathomable stranger, we can still open our eyes 
to the appreciation of grace in their individual faces.  Yet this proves no easy task as the 
two characters are circumscribed by the realities of violence and death – either animals 
are killed for food having suffered greatly in an impersonal system of production (which 
is Costello’s concern) or they are euthanized at animal clinics and shelters for burdening 
local populations (Lurie’s situation).  Moreover, Costello and Lurie each exhibit their fair 
share of difficulties relating to their families, and it is questionable if these particular 
issues are ever resolved by the texts.   
In this chapter, I want to explore textual encounters with animals as experienced 
by these two characters, Costello and Lurie, claiming that Lurie achieves a moment of 
grace at the end of Disgrace whereas Costello seems unable to imagine her way to any 
sort of religious or emotional release.  Grace surfaces, not just through the shadow of 
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disgrace, but as the potential for uncovering and creating right relationships and bonds 
with others.  While Lurie displays wariness of religious discourse, religious overtones 
nevertheless infuse his interactions with others, including his relationship with the 
animals of the novel.  Unexpectedly, individual animals form a crucial part of Lurie’s 
ethical and imaginative task and his realization of grace, in contrast to Costello who 
remains buried in a stack of animal corpses.  Throughout each text, both characters 
demonstrate how they have heard the call of animals – hearing animal voices so that they 
are no longer invisible – and have oriented themselves in body and mind to the animal’s 
needs.  They thus perform the ideas discussed in the first two chapters, modelling a 
means of critically reflecting on their visceral responses while demonstrating ways we 
can bear responsibility for our relationships with animals and thus move towards grace-
full relations.     
 
The Animal and the Imagination 
The Lives of Animals presents Elizabeth Costello first delivering an address to the 
philosophy department at fictional Appleton College in Waltham.  She admits that as a 
novelist she is a bit out of her field, but nevertheless does not spare the audience from her 
dissatisfaction with philosophical approaches to animal ethics.  Her blending of 
philosophy and poetic imagination thus wins no points from the philosophers present, 
especially her unsympathetic daughter-in-law Norma (specializing in philosophy of 
mind), and her use of the Holocaust as an analogy for the realities of animals in factory 
farming provokes their response still further (Jewish poet Abraham Stern declines to meet 
with Costello, sending her a note conveying his dismay at her analogy).  At an academic 
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dinner later the same evening, Costello refuses to soothe the rising tension surrounding 
questions of her ethical stance towards animals or of various philosophical and religious 
arguments about human-animal relations.  She presents one more lecture and participates 
in one debate before leaving Waltham, at which point, in trying to explain her obsession 
with animals to her son, she break down in his arms at her inability to perceive the deaths 
of animals with such dispassion as everyone else. 
Disgrace follows David Lurie, a professor of communications at a South African 
university attempting to navigate the post-apartheid climate.  Lurie becomes infatuated 
with a student, having an affair with her but rebuffing the attempts of a university 
committee to prompt him to confess or express a sense of guilt when the student brings a 
complaint against Lurie.  He leaves to move in with his daughter Lucy, a farmer with a 
bit of land who also kennels dogs, but they are soon attacked by three men who set Lurie 
on fire, lock him in the bathroom, rape Lucy, shoot the kennel dogs, and steal all that they 
can.  Lurie’s and Lucy’s previously detached relationship becomes further strained as 
Lucy, to Lurie’s utter incomprehension, does not report the rape.  He turns to assisting 
Bev Shaw in the local animal clinic, helping with the euthanizations and cremations that 
happen every week while finding that he is becomingly increasingly concerned about 
animals, even the bodies of the dead dogs that go into the incinerator.  His relations with 
Lucy do not improve as she decides to keep the baby that resulted from the rape, and 
Lurie moves out, focussing on writing his opera and caring for the dogs at the clinic. 
Though Disgrace includes animals as one strand of the novel among others, it, 
along with The Lives of Animals which explicitly takes animals as its subject, complicates 
simplistic assumptions about animals and their possible relationships with humans.  Both 
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novels ultimately reject the extremes of sentimental affection and moral rigidity while 
emphasizing the role that imagination plays in creatively enacting the encounter.  In this 
middle ground lies an attempt to let animals speak and influence the bonds of those 




For Elizabeth Costello, the animal is caught up in a system that views it solely as 
property valued only for certain commodities such as food, clothing, or domestic 
affection.  Its animality or the life of the animal (animal as self) is unimportant or 
considered to be irrelevant.  But seeing the animal anew – the animal that has been 
rendered invisible in the routinized banality of the everyday – also means acknowledging 
the animal as animal with its own particular way of being in the world.  This could, of 
course, involve mention of an animal’s biological individuality – a dolphin possesses 
different characteristics than does a spider – but is not reducible to such explanations.  
Animality recognizes a certain quality of vitality that is peculiar to each species and every 
single animal and as such stands as an integral part of seeing the face of the animal.   
In each of her lectures to the Philosophy and English Departments at Appleton 
College, Costello offers a way of thinking about animality when she invokes the poetics 
of imagining oneself into the being of an animal, firstly in regards to Thomas Nagel’s 
example of a bat (LA 35) and then Ted Hughes’ jaguar poem (LA 50-53).  She asks,  
“What is it like to be a bat?  Before we can answer such a question, Nagel 
suggests, we need to be able to experience bat-life through the sense-modalities of 
                                                          
86
 Derek Attridge, “Age of Bronze, State of Grace: Music and Dogs in Coetzee’s ‘Disgrace,’” NOVEL: A 
Forum on Fiction 34, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 98-121. 
65 
 
a bat.  But he is wrong; or at least he is sending us down a false trail.  To be a 
living bat is to be full of being; being fully a bat is like being fully human, which 
is also to be full of being...To be full of being is to live as a body-soul.  One name 
for the experience of full being is joy.” (LA 33) 
By bodying forth the jaguar, Hughes shows us that we too can embody animals – 
by the process called poetic invention that mingles breath and sense in a way that 
no one has explained and no one ever will.  He shows us how to bring the living 
body into being within ourselves...we are for a brief while the jaguar.  He ripples 
within us, he takes over our body, he is us. (LA 53) 
Employing the imagination to immerse oneself in the animal’s being is one part of the 
process of attuning oneself to the animal, while constituting, as Alice Brittan argues, a 
necessary component of refiguring bonds of grace and moving past the moral and 
emotional impoverishment of disgrace.  She observes that “[m]ost of Coetzee’s novels 
are about the bankruptcy of this economy of imagining, which means that they are about 
disgrace.  His characters inhabit worlds that have prohibited them from learning to 
imagine one another, especially across the divides of race and gender, and therefore all 
they know how to do is to steal or go without.”
87
  Costello’s example of imaging bat-
being and jaguar-being provides a bridge across the divide between humans and non-
human animals, opening up the possibility of abundant relations full of grace.
88
  Samuel 
Wells emphasizes abundance as a crucial element in realizing God’s work in the midst of 
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us, positioning it against scarcity – or bankruptcy – as necessary to effect meaningful as 
well as ethical relationality.
89
  Wells would agree with Costello’s emphasis on the 
imagination as crucial to achieving deepened connections with others, with the additional 
note that imagination participates in the re-orientation of sight so that one can see 
abundance where previously one saw only lack.   
This is, as Brittan observes, a core problem in Disgrace where the task, 
particularly for the main character David Lurie, becomes utilizing the imagination in the 
fraught relations of post-apartheid.  Lurie never specifically engages in the imaginative 
exercises that Costello encourages her audience to practice, but he does occupy himself in 
two notable ways:  he writes an opera about Byron and his last lover, Teresa Guiccioli, 
and becomes more involved in the lives of the animals around him who are usually slated 
for death.  Both of “these themes [the opera and dogs] increase in importance as the novel 
goes on, the space given to them on the pages reflecting their growing role in Lurie’s 
daily existence,”
90
 and, I would add, in his own sphere of imagination.  Lurie undergoes a 
shift from a general disinterest in animals to experiencing bonds with them, bonds which, 
moreover, work to subtly influence Lurie and provoke him in new directions:  “The 
powerful but baffling claim made by the sheep on him is, it seems, far from either the 
emotional pull experienced by the animal lover or the ethical demand acknowledged by 
the upholder of animal rights.”
91
  The sheep are destined to be the main course at Petrus’ 
(Lucy’s employee and neighbour) party, and Lurie significantly finds himself neither 
indifferent to nor passionate about the sheep or the other animals of the novel.  This 
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middle road is no less taxing (perhaps even more so) emotionally or imaginatively than 
complete indifference or affection, and it demonstrates a certain quality of receptivity 
Lurie has to the animals around him.  This openness on Lurie’s part to such an 
unexpected rapport with animals partly speaks to Attridge’s idea of grace as “a condition 
of constant receptiveness to the divine.”
92
 In an echo of Catherine Keller, the divine may 
appear in strange places as well as in surprising figures – “the “arrival of the unexpected 
in unexpectedly beneficent form”
93
 – even as this appearance accentuates the need for 
ethical response. 
Both books also hint at another way of approaching relationality with animals, 
one simultaneously laced with imagination but more focussed on their actual presence 
rather than our imaginative outreach:  they avoid “fixing” the animal to one mode of 
discursive representation, instead suggesting that the animal possesses its own agency 
and that poetics is a means of encountering it.  In other words, both texts admit that the 
animal can address us, calling to us to respond ethically in the Levinasian sense.  The 
characters rely on knowledge gained through relationality rather than what Costello dubs 
the “less interesting thought” of scientific reasoning (LA 29).  Aaron Moe would term this 
zoopoetics, wherein animals “engag[e] imaginatively with their own kind, with other 
species, with their environments, and with the human-other.”
94
  Costello presents the case 
of Sultan the ape, captured and taken to a research station on an island for the purposes of 
“experimentation into the mental capacities of apes” (LA 27).  Sultan had to endure his 
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food being placed in increasingly complex situations such that he had to maneuver crates 
or use implements to obtain the food.  Costello once again uses imaginative empathy 
(possibly a deterrent to true zoopoetics for Moe, but nevertheless gesturing in that 
direction), though with the intent of signifying the fact that Sultan had his own 
perspective on what was happening to him as well as an understanding of what the 
correct response was, and thus that he was aware that his actions would influence his 
relations with his food and the man giving the food: 
Sultan knows: Now one is supposed to think.  That is what the bananas up there 
are about.  The bananas are there to make one think, to spur one to the limits of 
one’s thinking.  But what must one think?  One thinks: Why is he starving me? 
One thinks: What have I done? Why has he stopped liking me? One thinks: Why 
does he not want these crates any more? But none of these is the right 
thought...The right thought to think is: How does one use the crates to reach the 
bananas?...One is beginning to see how the man’s mind works. (LA 28) 
Sultan had a family, a social group, and a past before he was captured, but now he is 
“relentlessly propelled toward lower, practical, instrumental reason (How does one use 
this to get that?) and thus toward acceptance of himself as primarily an organism with an 
appetite that needs to be satisfied” (LA 29).  The researcher reduces Sultan to biological 
animality whereas Costello urges her listeners (and readers) to see how Sultan 
communicates to humans through his actions.  He plays the game, so to speak, despite his 
real question – the question that “occupies the rat and the cat and every other animal 
trapped in the hell of the laboratory or the zoo” – being:  “Where is home and how do I 
get there?” (LA 30).  That, however, is a question in which the researcher is not 
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interested, nor is he concerned about Sultan’s own agency of behaviour in relation to 
humans, other apes, or his own family.  Conversely, Costello’s poetics acknowledges that 
animals possess their own space within reality and text and that they, too, have their own 
imaginative modes of engaging the world.  Such a recognition forms a part of bridging 
the divide between humans and animals and ushering in the abundance that results from 
bonds of grace – of finding resonances across differences, to use Jan Zwicky’s terms.  I 
would suggest that this is the crux of Costello’s statement: “That is the kind of poetry I 
bring to your attention today:  poetry that does not try to find an idea in the animal, that is 
not about the animal, but is instead a record of an engagement with him” (LA 51).   
This kind of record emerges in Disgrace, where Lurie learns to encounter the 
animal and respond ethically to them, while they engage and address him and offer him 
the potential for grace-full relations.  The sheep are part of this process, as we have seen, 
and so is Lucy’s watchdog, Katy.  However, it is one particular dog that stands out for 
Lurie.  While dogs comprise most of the animals that appear in Disgrace and generally 
seem to exhibit all the stereotypical dog behaviours, such ordinariness is where we find 
the beginning of the extraordinary of which Cavell speaks, including the agency of 
animals we often take for granted.  Within the confines of the animal clinic where Lurie 
volunteers, a dog with a withered leg gradually attaches himself to Lurie.  He “is 
fascinated by the sound of the banjo” (D 215), trying to sing along with the music.  He 
also “adopts” Lurie, sleeping at his feet and licking his face.  Such behaviour may seem 
trivial, but it is key both to the ending of the novel and to any possibility of hope for 
Lurie that this ending holds.  The dog reaches out to Lurie, accepting and loving him and 
70 
 
thus providing a model for abundant relationality.
95
  In such extravagant love, the 
wounded dog acknowledges Lurie’s face, which in turn prompts Lurie to appreciate the 
dog’s “losability” and thus his preciousness.  Beyond any philosophical debates about the 
morality of animals, the dog performs the ethical response that is so crucial for Levinas – 
“the dog would die for him, he knows” (D 215) – embodying the radicality of what we 
might call grace. 
 
Baring/Bearing One’s Soul 
Costello’s son and his wife consider her preoccupation with animals to be nothing 
more than her latest ‘hobbyhorse,’ the fleeting cause of an old, tired woman.  Their 
refusal to take her seriously belies their own lack or sight, their persistent unwillingness 
to be re-oriented to positions other than their own, much less to put themselves in the 
jaguar’s body (LA 51-53).  On the other end of the spectrum of response comes 
admiration, stemming from a kind of polite, if detached, respect for her moral stance.  
Costello herself is less optimistic about her motivations, evincing a kind of desperation 
when the issue arises:  “But your own vegetarianism, Mrs. Costello,” says President 
Garrard, pouring oil on troubled waters:  “it comes out of moral conviction, does it not?”  
“No, I don’t think so,” says his mother.  “It comes out of a desire to save my soul” (LA 
43).  Costello’s response illuminates the tepid ethics behind President Garrard’s 
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 – moral conviction pales beside the anguish that implicates Costello’s whole 
being, including an unshakeable sense of culpability.  And yet, though Costello wears 
leather – what she calls an example of “degrees of obscenity” with no substantial 
distinction from meat-eating
97
 – perhaps her leather items are less a failure of her resolve 
or any indifference to the animal skins that make up her clothing than of her inescapable 
entwinement in a system built on the corpses of animals.  Her guilt indicates how she has 
been engulfed in her sensitivity to the animals around her as well as her helplessness to 
significantly change the system.  But it also points to how her embodied relationality, of 
knowing the animal through imagining herself in their being, can lead to paralysis – her 
soul is sore and inflamed, and, while she is not afraid to speak about societal treatment of 
animals, she ultimately collapses into her son’s arms under the weight she is carrying:  
“‘Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain out of a molehill.  This is life.  
Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t you?  Why can’t you?’ She turns on him 
a tearful face.  What does she want, he thinks?  Does she want me to answer her question 
for her?” (LA 69).   
David Lurie also experiences such a moment.  While Costello explicitly struggles 
with the cruelty and indifference to animals that most people exhibit, she never mentions 
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any specific encounters with animals except textual ones.
98
  For Lurie, the obverse is true: 
he has been one of the uncritical majority Costello sees all around her until he moves in 
with his daughter, after which he encounters more and more animals as the novel goes on.  
He furthermore encounters them not as packaged consumer products – little bits of soap 
or shrink-wrapped meat – but as living, breathing specific animals who most of the time 
are about to meet their death.  In other words, he meets them face-to-face, holding them 
“so that the needle can find the vein” (D 219), letting them lick him right before the drugs 
work.  There is no escaping the call of these animals at this moment, but there is also no 
way to escape their deaths.  The ethical implications of what he is doing gnaw at Lurie 
until he is physically and emotionally overwhelmed, his whole being wounded just like 
Elizabeth Costello
99
:   
He had thought he would get used to it.  But that is not what happens.  The more 
killings he assists in, the more jittery he gets.  One Sunday evening, driving home 
in Lucy’s kombi, he actually has to stop at the roadside to recover himself.  Tears 
flow down his face that he cannot stop; his hands shake.  He does not understand 
what is happening to him.  Until now he has been more or less indifferent to 
animals.  Although in an abstract way he disapproves of cruelty, he cannot tell 
whether by nature he is cruel or kind.  He is simply nothing. (D 143) 
Lurie can no longer tuck away his thoughts and feelings into rationalized, disinterested 
abstraction.  Instead, the sheer excess engendered by the latest events of his life and the 
large number of animal deaths in which he has been complicit boils to the top and 
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overflows, rendering him mentally and emotionally shattered and physically weakened.  
His whole body betrays his affectedness, exposing his vulnerability to the call of the 
novel’s animals as well as his inability to help them.  He can no more change the system 
than can Elizabeth Costello, a realization both bear with agonizing distress.   
At the same time, both exhibit damaged relations with the people around them, 
especially with family members.  Costello’s relationship with her son is distant and 
decidedly strained with her daughter-in-law, Norma.  She makes no attempt to be 
sociable to the guests at the university dinner, neither defusing the tension building 
around her clipped replies nor seriously engaging their concerns about animal ethics.  She 
is, as her son describes her, “gray and tired and confused” (LA 44), revealing the same 
bodily vulnerability as Lurie.  Lurie himself cannot seem to forge any constructive 
relationships with people, except possibly Bev Shaw who runs the animal clinic and who 
he assists in the killings; even then, he considers her unattractive, and, though he has an 
affair with her, feels no substantial affection for her.  The rest of his relationships are, to 
put it mildly, a disaster, especially with his student and his daughter.  He cannot seem to 
understand Lucy’s refusal to report the attack on her, or her decision to keep the child that 
results from it.  He is unable to “stand back and let Lucy work out solutions for herself” 
(D 210), preferring to buffer himself in the role of protective, if unimaginative, parent.  
Consequently, she asks him to leave, which he does, though in injured self-righteousness: 
“‘And am I part of what you are prepared to sacrifice?’ She shrugs. ‘I didn’t say it, you 
said it.’ ‘Then I’ll pack my bags’” (D 208). 
Paradoxically, animals are the only beings left with whom Costello and Lurie can 
build any semblance of connection and respect.  Though he resists naming the dog with 
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the withered leg, Lurie nevertheless “has come to feel a particular fondness” for the dog, 
realizing in return that “[a]rbitrarily, unconditionally, he has been adopted; the dog would 
die for him, he knows” (D 215).  If Mike Marais contests the idea that Lurie achieves a 
sympathetic imagination with others by the end of the novel, perhaps it is because Marais 
discounts the presence of animals in the text and their effects on Lurie’s character.
100
   
How do we make a space for our own helplessness when we face the animal, 
much less theirs?  While Lurie consciously resists the language of salvation – denying the 
religious discourse of grace, confession, guilt, and repentance at his university hearing for 
sexual misconduct – it is only in terms of such concepts that the paralysis and wounding 
borne by Lurie and Costello can be acknowledged and fused into the response the face of 
the animal needs.  The mystery of grace trusts that where the self fails, God takes over.
101
  
Thus, at the breakdown of emotions and language, there emerges the potential for the self 
to be re-oriented to animal and to God.  Similarly, an acknowledgement of our limits and 
helplessness is necessary for the moment of metanoia to occur.  Even if Lurie never fully 
reaches the place of repentance, we can, along with Attridge and Brittan, suggest that he 
finds himself enfolded within the bonds of grace.   
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Bidding the Animal (and ourselves) Àdieu 
He opens the cage door. ‘Come,’ he says, bends, opens his arms.  The dog wags 
its crippled rear, sniffs his face, licks his cheeks, his lips, his ears.  He does 
nothing to stop it. ‘Come.’  Bearing him in his arms like a lamb, he re-enters the 
surgery. ‘I thought you would save him for another week,’ says Bev Shaw.  ‘Are 
you giving him up?’  ‘Yes, I am giving him up.’ (D 220) 
 
Disgrace concludes with yet another death, but this time it is the dog with the 
withered leg, the one who likes music and who has adopted Lurie and, at the same time, 
the one for whom Lurie has developed a fondness.
102
  By this time, Lurie has assisted 
with many euthanizations, acting as a dog “psychopomp” (D 146) in guiding the dead to 
the afterlife and caring for – “honouring” – their bodies when they are sent to the 
incinerator.  In so doing, Lurie demonstrates an ethical responsibility towards the animals 
that both takes account of and concludes with their deaths.  Alice Brittan argues that 
Lurie “bear[s] witness to death until there is nothing left to see, acknowledging the claims 
to recognition made by the body even after the spirit is gone...David’s purpose is not to 
alter the fact of death but to pay it attention, because to think of the dead is to hold them a 
little longer within the reaches of what can be thought, and thus to prolong grace.”
103
  
Death is no longer a disgrace, something at which to hang one’s head in shame, but rather 
an event to which we bear witness and hold with us a little longer, the excess of which 
will continue to shape our ethical imagination.   
The attentiveness of bearing witness grasps both the resonances of Zwicky’s lyric 
understanding, wherein lyric or poetics can comprehend a depth of meaning not available 
in other forms of discourse, and the significance of reaching for religious language to 
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represent this experience.   Brittan may not adhere to a Christian notion of grace, but the 
term nevertheless arouses the association, especially given that “this [religious] discourse 
already steeps his [Lurie’s] thinking,” despite his own rejection of the language of guilt, 
confession, repentance, and salvation.
104
  Lurie certainly seems unable to evade such 
Christian overtones, and the inflection in the final scene with the dog is therefore notable: 
Lurie “bear[s] him in his arms like a lamb” (D 220) into the surgery, evoking both the 
image of Christ on his way to dying by crucifixion illustrated in Acts 8:32 – “Like a 
sheep he was led to the slaughter, and like a lamb silent before its shearer, so he does not 
open his mouth”
105
 – and the lamb representing Christ in Zurbaran’s paintings.  The 
refraction of this specific animal imagery – dog like a lamb – proves interesting not just 
for the centrality of animals to the conclusion of the novel, though this is very much the 
case, but for its intimation of the death and sacrifice of Christ and its connection to the 
lambs that act as metaphorical placeholder for Christ.
106
  In bearing witness to the dog’s 
death, Lurie simultaneously bears witness to the dying of the innocent – Christ’s dying – 
finding the possibility of hope therein, what Brittan calls the image of a “lightened 
horizon.”
107
  At the same time, Lurie does not subsume the dog into the larger paradigm 
of sacrifice, making it yet another voiceless victim like the lambs in the Agnus Dei 
paintings.  Instead, he is keenly aware of its own unique enfleshed existence as evidenced 
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in his acknowledgement of its love of music, its affection for him, and its challenges with 
its withered leg. 
It is this notion of bearing witness tied with the possibility of hope that seems to 
me to be mingled with ethical promise for Lurie in a way not realized for Costello.  Lurie, 
if he has not ‘come to terms’ with it so to speak, at least understands that there are things 
one can do in the face of death.  And while death does not represent the unavoidable 
condition for every encounter with an animal, it certainly encapsulates the confrontation 
with the “losability” that Zwicky describes.  It also offers a means of exploring one’s 
responsibility to the animal within the perception of one’s own limits, and therefore of 
moving past the woundedness and paralysis immobilizing Lurie. 
Lurie’s decision to finally allow the euthanization of the dog who likes music 
therefore marks not the conclusion of their ethical relationship, but a continued, perhaps 
even renewed, call upon Lurie himself.  Levinas thought that ethical responsibility did not 
conclude after the other’s death, as if the death of the other affords us an escape route 
from ethical concern for them.  Lurie demonstrates this idea when he feels ethically 
responsible for honouring the bodies of the dead dogs about to be burned in order to enact 
“his idea of the world, a world in which men do not use shovels to beat corpses into a 
more convenient shape for processing” (D 146).  Levinas describes this in how 
The Other individuates me in my responsibility for him.  The death of the Other 
affects me in my very identity as a responsible I...made up of unspeakable 
responsibility.  This is how I am affected by the death of the Other, this is my 
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relation to his death.  It is, in my relation, my deference toward someone who no 
longer responds, already a guilt of the survivor.
108
  
Costello, as we have seen, possesses guilt aplenty, immobilized in her soul and alienated 
in her relations with other people.  But while Levinas may identify the guilt of the 
survivor as an inevitable component of the other’s death, Derrida understands him as 
shifting guilt from the blame and culpability that Costello feels to the reaction of the 
“upright”:  “Levinas indeed speaks of the survivor’s guilt, but it is a guilt without fault 
and without debt; it is, in truth, an entrusted responsibility, entrusted in a moment of 
unparalleled emotion.”
109
  Costello grasps the idea that the death of the other and our 
frequently emotional, visceral response entrusts us with the task of responsibility, but she 
cannot move past a negative embodiment of survivor’s guilt.  There can be no peace for 
her in her relationships with animals, only a haunting sense of failure. 
In speaking of the death of the other, Levinas also re-thought the familiar 
expression of farewell, the àdieu.  It was something he and Derrida discussed together, 
and when Levinas died, Derrida presented the eulogy as his own personal àdieu to one of 
his great friends.
110
  They wanted to recapture the valence of commending another to (à) 
God (Dieu) as a means of expressing one’s relationship to the other, the other’s death, to 
our newly-renewed commitment to the other, and to God.  For both philosophers, the 
àdieu in and of itself “is not a finality” but “greets the Other beyond being” in an instance 
that is “signified, beyond being, by the word ‘glory’” (13).  In this way, the àdieu 
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functions as a powerful performative gesture serving all at once to say good-bye, declare 
the renewal of responsibility in a greeting of the animal beyond being, and to re-call to 
God the body and spirit of the animal.  It bears witness to the other’s death and shoulders 
the responsibility entrusted as a result of that death, but it also implies a farewell, a letting 
go of the other as well as of our own feelings of negative guilt and helplessness. 
For John Caputo, the àdieu marks a fundamental positioning of the self towards 
God.  We dedicate our relational vulnerability to God in what Caputo describes as 
“Adieu: (I commend you) ‘to God’ (à Dieu), may God be with you.  This word is a 
beautiful prayer embedded in ordinary language, and it is very precious for Levinas, for 
upon it, in a real sense, everything turns.”
111
  Àdieu is the culmination of one’s 
positioning towards God and the animal, a prayer for the animal’s wellbeing and a 
committing to God of the precariousness of life and the fragility of all relationships.  The 
àdieu thus reiterates the qualities that constitute any encounter with an animal – exposure, 
vulnerability, and “losability.”  In this way, it bears within itself the fundamental 
helplessness of human beings in the face of the Other’s extraordinary request – we will 
never be able to fulfill the needs of all the animals of the world, whether it be for love, 
life, or health.  The àdieu admits this, giving our self to God when we run up against the 
inevitable awareness of our own limits and needs.   
Through this positioning towards God and animal, the àdieu marks the realization 
of grace – of the fostering of a relationship based on the cultivation of bonds and the 
embrace of emotional interaction.  This is not necessarily a conscious, determined move 
on our part, but accepts the bonds we already have with each other and with God:   
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For Levinas, àdieu, from ad deum, ‘to God,’ has the sense of being turned to God.  
The à in à-Dieu represents a turn toward God, not a turn taken by the conscious 
freedom of an auto-turning autonomous self, but a being-already-turned to God, 
long before the conscious self steps in and takes one turn or another.  Hence: Here 
I am (me voici) always already turned by God to God: à Dieu.
112
   
Caputo’s insistence that getting to the moment of the àdieu is not a conscious, intentional 
effort simultaneously emphasizes the continuous nature of relationality – we always bear 
the trace of the other as we move on to new encounters and new opportunities for saying 
the prayer embodied by the àdieu.  Though the task of imagining oneself in the animal’s 
being is a deliberate one relying – at least to an extent – on personal will, it nevertheless 
points to this pre-positioning described by Caputo as well as the excess of the encounter 
that seeps into the body to influence the next encounter.  David Lurie’s character does not 
change “all at once” – it requires a process (Cavell’s task of ethical imagination) in order 
for Lurie to love the dog with the withered leg.  One can see appearances beforehand, as 
when Lurie takes it upon himself to care for the bodies of the dead dogs when they are 
about to be incinerated, or in his surprising concern for the sheep to be killed for the 
party.  However, Lurie’s final words (and the concluding words of the novel) – “Yes, I 
am giving him up” (D 220) – signal his ability to finally verbalize a realization on Lurie’s 
part that some things cannot be evaded or saved for another week.  It has been the very 
process of learning to love and finding one’s responsibility that illuminates the very act of 
cradling the dog at the moment of euthanasia as a tender benediction, a heart-breaking 
performance of the final à-Dieu.   
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The Promise of Grace 
I find it significant that the novel begins with Lurie on his way to a tryst with a 
woman he pays for sex and ends with him holding in his arms a dog to be euthanized.  
Ascription of any concrete moral progression to Lurie’s character would be both 
simplistic and premature,
113
 and I do not see either Coetzee or Disgrace as offering the 
“affirmation of animal lives” as a solution to the “multiple problems of the age”
114
 or as a 
panacea for his personal relationships.  However, I do understand Lurie’s relationality 
with the animals of Disgrace to gesture towards his potential to “educate the eye” (D 
218) and extend hospitality to them, even if it is only their corpses he is honouring.   
His encounters with animals have proven not to be merely a side path or diversion 
as he wrestles with the emotional and interpersonal aftermath of Lucy’s rape and his 
beating.  Instead, these encounters have tugged responses from Lurie that he could not 
give to the humans around him.  Despite the death that surrounds all these animals – from 
the kennel dogs who are shot by the intruders, the sheep who provide the food for Petrus’ 
party, and all the cats and dogs who are euthanized every week – Lurie can now name 
attention to them as love:  “He and Bev do not speak.  He has learned by now, from her, 
to concentrate all his attention on the animal they are killing, giving it what he no longer 
has difficulty in calling by its proper name: love” (D 219).  While I am not sure he 
employs Costello’s form of imagination, immersing the self into bat-being or jaguar-
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being, Lurie has nevertheless experienced a reorientation towards animals and life, which 
perhaps signals his own return from the realm of the dead.
115
  His loving àdieu to the dog 
with the withered leg, the one who loves the music of the banjo and tries to sing along, 
marks his exposure to others and thus his new-found openness to grace.
116
  It is a 
constructive response to the animal that embodies love’s knowledge as well as an ethical 
imagination that relies on the contingencies of face-to-face relationship.  Costello 
experiences no such moment of committing the self and animal to God, and we close 
with her in her son’s arms, still helpless and vulnerable.  All she gets is the rather dubious 
reassurance from her son that “[i]t will soon be over” (LA 69).    
Both David Lurie and Elizabeth Costello have been submerged by helplessness – 
Lurie by the sudden coalescence of violence and death in his life and Costello by what 
she perceives as the corpses of dead animals wherever she goes and the normality of 
people in the face of this.  Coetzee ends both books with a curious moment of embrace – 
Lurie cradles the dog with the withered leg and Costello is held by her son as she weeps.  
For Costello, this bespeaks her powerlessness and flawed family relations, but for Lurie it 
points to his love for the dog he is carrying.  As Caputo writes, “God’s epiphany takes 
place in the face-to-face relationship with the stranger.”
117
  Disgrace reminds us that it is 
about doing what we can, when we can, and, moreover, never forsaking the animal in 
front of us: 
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He can save the young dog, if he wishes, for another week.  But a time must 
come, it cannot be evaded, when he will have to bring him to Bev Shaw in her 
operating room (perhaps he will carry him in his arms, perhaps he will do that for 
him) and caress him and brush back the fur so that the needle can find the vein, 
and whisper to him and support him in the moment when, bewilderingly, his legs 
buckle; and then, when the soul is out, fold him up and pack him away in his bag, 
and the next day wheel the bag into the flames and see that it is burnt, burnt up.  
He will do all that for him when his time comes.  It will be little enough, less than 
little: nothing. (D 220) 
But that little enough is not nothing – it is enough, and it is enough to sustain hope for 
Lurie’s character even if no resolutions or promises are made by the end of the novel, 
momentarily serving to take him out of his self-absorption into care for the vulnerability 
of another being.  He has indeed experienced an unsought and unexpected epiphany, but 





















The truth is, he has never had much of an eye for rural life, despite all his reading 
in Wordsworth.  Not much of an eye for anything, except pretty girls; and where 





There is no theoretical way to ‘get this right.’ The only way to negotiate the 
multiple dangers and reap the possible harvests is to ‘make an art of ordinary 
living.’  At the heart of this Williams tells us, is learning to live without fear of 
the radical ordinary, learning a strange freedom from our relentless efforts to exit 
the challenges and gifts of the present by deepening the vortex of ‘the busy and 






I have been glad to see the discussion about animals in theology growing over the 
past few years, a discussion that has been questioning Christianity’s relationship with 
animals and pondering the shape of our ethical responses to them.  This body of writing 
takes seriously the idea that animals have a claim on our theological attention and that 
they are a significant part of the body of God.  It is still a relatively new area, however, 
and a comparatively minute one at that, but I find hope in it that, as Christians, we will 
continue to think about our interactions with animals so that we may welcome them into 
the kingdom of God instead of excluding them.  This involves extending to them love and 
hospitality on an individual basis as well as the eco-theological interest in their collective 
place in the world.  
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This thesis looks at a particular moment – an encounter with an individual animal 
– and reflects on how we experience and represent that encounter in order to find ways 
we can develop our ethical responses.  Rather than turning to arguments about the status 
of animals, I look to poetics in order to explore the indeterminacy, vulnerability, and 
exposure that arise out of meeting animals face-to-face.  Levinas stresses that ethics is 
“first philosophy” and that our encounters with others always carry an ethical dimension; 
poetics makes a space in which to consider these ethical facets without resorting to more 
rigid strands of moral philosophy that place little emphasis on the role of embodiment, 
including the emotions and visceral impressions.  Novels such as Disgrace and The Lives 
of Animals and paintings such as the Agnus Dei series urge us to think about the 
relationships depicted so that we may similarly be attuned to the unique circumstances in 
which we encounter animals in our own lives.  
In The Ethics of Sex, Mark Jordan expresses optimism in negative theology for 
rethinking sexual ethics, arguing that   
it has freed theological language from the smallness of human purposes – of 
human regimes – for the possibilities of transcendence.  We need new roles for 
speaking sexual ethics.  We thus also need new genres for our speaking.  I 
imagine that they will be less like the single-voice genres of legal code or verdict 
and more like the polyphony of complex narratives or lyrics written over a 
lifetime.  Audre Lorde...once wrote: ‘where language does not yet exist, it is our 
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poetry which helps us to fashion it.  Poetry is not only dream and vision; it is the 
skeleton architecture of our lives.’
120
 
The poetics I am invoking here hopefully points to new genres and new roles with which 
to animate the development of animal ethics within theology.  It can do God-talk in an 
amazingly rich and inventive style, touching on the life and breath of meeting God 
through individual animals.  The poetics of the encounter encourages us to come face to 
face with them, re-considering our epistemological prejudices so that we can hear them 
when they address us.    Their call transforms our everyday lives into the radical ordinary 
of which Romand Coles and Rowan Williams speak, wherein the call of Christ suffuses 
all that we do so that even minute day-to-day decisions become steeped in ethical 
significance.  At the same time, this poetics realizes that each new encounter with an 
animal forms a layer that adds to the architecture of which Audre Lorde speaks so that we 
are continually influenced by their presence and drawn to broaden our responsibility. 
Implicit within John Caputo’s idea of hospitality in the kingdom of God as the 
reaching out in love to the stranger (discussed in Chapter 2) is also the realization that at 
any moment we may be the ones who require hospitality and who will need someone to 
imagine themselves into our being, just as Elizabeth Costello did for Sultan the ape, the 
bat, and the jaguar.  While such reciprocity is not necessarily constitutive of the 
encounter with animals, it marks recognition of our personal fragility and how we can 
embrace what Jan Zwicky calls resonances across differences, caring for the animal’s 
vulnerability while admitting our own.  The radical ordinary highlights the fact that our 
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ethical responses are a work in progress, a process in which we can admit our limits while 
reaching out to greater heights of hospitality and love. 
At the same time, being attentive to animals through poetics involves “making an 
art of everyday living,” while understanding that it is never too late to “educate the eye.”  
There may be no way to get all the ethical aspects right, so to speak, but we can 
nonetheless share vulnerabilities and forge constructive relationships with the animals 
around us.  In doing so, we can move towards the promise of grace, of seeing the love of 
God in the face of the animal and cultivating ethical and social bonds with them, even if 
involves great personal struggle.  This is the poetics of how we grapple with, shape, 
frame, represent, meld ourselves in the interstices of our existence while ethically and 
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